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For the last decade, I have been teaching law students about fed-
eral civil rights legislation.' Together, we have dissected statutory lan-
guage and pondered the meaning of the United States Supreme
Court's various pronouncements. Over the years, the Supreme
Court's decisions on issues relating to attorneys' fees and damages
have led my students to wonder whether, in the real world, civil rights
practice has become so risky that attorneys hesitate to represent po-
tential plaintiffs. Given my perch in academia, detached from practic-
ing lawyers, these were not questions I could answer with any degree
of confidence.
My increasing discomfort with the limits of a purely academic fo-
cus on these fundamental questions about the viability of civil rights
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I benefited
from the advice and comments of Theodore Eisenberg, Margaret Johns, Larry Levine,
Brian K. Landsberg, John Cary Sims and Harvey Williams. I appreciate the financial sup-
port provided by McGeorge School of Law and the research assistance of Karen Bishop,
Christina Black, Aura Kashin, Linda Yackzan, Miren First and Carrie Pratt. Most of all, I
thank the lawyers who participated in this study.
1. Federal civil rights legislation, as that term is used in this article, includes actions
brought under Reconstruction era statutes and modem civil rights statutes. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1994), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)
(1994), The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994), The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,29 U.S.C § 701 (1994), The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994) and the
Voting Rights Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994). For purposes of limiting the scope of
the project, I did not include litigation under other federal statutes that seek to promote
the public interest and authorize fee shifting, such as the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401
(1994) or the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
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practice led to the study that is the focus of this Article. Through
interviews with civil fights lawyers, I attempted to build on their ex-
periences and perceptions to develop answers to the questions that my
students posed. The explanations and strategies of these practitioners
offers insight into the state of private enforcement of civil rights legis-
lation in the mid-1990's. 2 With a more concrete understanding of the
challenges civil rights lawyers face, legislators, civil rights advocates,
lawyers, and courts can more confidently begin to address some of the
issues that undercut the promise and ultimate effectiveness of civil
rights legislation.
My hypothesis as I began this research was that a series of
Supreme Court decisions had severely undermined the policy and in-
tent of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 19763 and other
fee-shifting statutes in federal civil rights legislation. By those stat-
utes, Congress sought to give lawyers an incentive to represent plain-
tiffs in civil rights cases by awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party.4 Statutory fees offered the promise that vindicating federal
rights could be at least as lucrative as some other types of law practice.
In the years since Congress enacted the Attorney's Fees Awards Act,
however, Supreme Court decisions have sanctioned the practice of
permitting waivers of attorneys' fees as a condition of settlement,5 im-
bued Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with enormous
impact in civil rights cases, 6 eliminated contingent risk enhancement
of fees,7 and defined the damages available for violations of civil rights
in a manner that minimizes the intangible or non-pecuniary character
of many of the federal rights in issue.8 Accustomed as I am to the
2. In all, I interviewed 35 attorneys. Given the small sample size, the portrait that
emerges is necessarily incomplete. Nonetheless, it offers a glimpse of civil rights practice in
a wide variety of practice settings and substantive areas. For a description of the method-
ology and content of the study, see infra text accompanying notes 31-37.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 38-49.
5. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
6. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 127-137.
7. Contingent risk enhancements, or multipliers, increase the amount of attorneys'
fees awarded in a given case to compensate attorneys for the risk entailed in certain types
of litigation. The discretion of trial courts to award such enhancements was virtually elimi-
nated in City of Burlington v. Dague, 502 U.S. 107 (1992). See infra text accompanying
notes 150-164.
8. Memphis Community v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1986) (holding that com-
pensatory damages in section 1983 cases are to be awarded for actual injury and not for
any abstract value attached to a constitutional claim); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266
(1978) (holding that damages for violation of constitutional rights are compensatory in
nature and that unless actual damages are proven, nominal damages should be awarded).
See infra text accompanying notes 192-206.
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soothing generalities of academic life, I expected to hear that attor-
neys for civil rights plaintiffs encounter such obstacles daily, and I
hoped to try to ascertain the circumstances in which these conse-
quences were most severe.
But as practitioners know, practice is rarely as neat and compart-
mentalized as theory, and I found the reality of civil rights practice in
the mid-1990's not nearly as simple as I envisioned at the outset. First,
the practices of civil rights attorneys differ so much from one another
that asking questions about civil rights litigation in general is often not
very productive. The attorneys I interviewed practice in a variety of
subspecialties, such as employment, voting rights, police misconduct,
civil rights class actions, and prison conditions litigation. The
Supreme Court's decisions on fees and damages affect differently dis-
tinct types of practice. Second, even within subspecialties, variations
in the practices of participants exist. For example, the employment
discrimination attorneys I interviewed ranged from sole practitioners
renting tiny offices to members of firms occupying the upper floors of
beautiful office buildings to non-profit lawyers in converted ware-
houses. Fees and damages issues inevitably affect these diverse prac-
tices differently. Third, various other factors significantly influence
whether an attorney will choose to represent a client. These factors
include substantive law, the political and economic climate, and class
differences between potential jurors and the prospective client.
Despite finding differences among areas of civil rights practice
and the practitioners themselves, I emerged from this project with a
clearer picture of how Supreme Court decisions have affected civil
rights practice and how other variables enter into the decision about
whether to represent a potential client. As I discuss in this Article, a
number of factors have coalesced to make some types of civil rights
litigation less attractive than other types of law practice. I believe the
Supreme Court's decisions have adversely affected the economic via-
bility of civil rights litigation in several significant ways-albeit not in
precisely the ways I had anticipated. Specifically, the Court's decision
regarding waivers of attorneys' fees has affected settlement behavior,
strengthening defendants' leverage and converting the process of set-
tlement negotiation into the equivalent of a personal injury negotia-
tion. Lump-sum offers are the rule, with fees figured in an amount
that is consistent with the amount of damages being offered. 9 This
practice, along with the Supreme Court's damages rules, sometimes
9. See infra text accompanying notes 100-108.
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leads to undercompensation of plaintiffs' attorneys, and produces dis-
incentives to represent plaintiffs in cases that lack "personal injury"-
type damages.' 0 These disincentives to undertake representation also
exist with respect to some low-income plaintiffs in certain types of liti-
gation." The Supreme Court's decision eliminating contingent risk
enhancement has also taken its toll, particularly in cases where multi-
pliers previously compensated for the risk of loss in cases that are very
expensive to litigate. 12
These effects are serious and troubling, and the Supreme Court
or Congress ought to address them by broadening availability of ex-
pert witness fees, revising the damages rules, or restoring the discre-
tion of trial courts to grant enhancements of fees in certain specified
circumstances.' 3 Neither I nor the practitioners who participated in
the study would view legal reforms as having the power to completely
eradicate poverty, discrimination, class bias, and other deprivations
that many civil rights plaintiffs experience in their daily lives. None-
theless, legal reforms should rightfully accompany other means of
combating the effects of discrimination and violations of basic consti-
tutional guarantees. This concern is even more urgent when one rec-
ognizes that the potential plaintiffs who are most affected by economic
disincentives to attorneys are those who are most vulnerable. The
poor and the underemployed are often disadvantaged because, to the
extent earnings are low, their damages are too low to offer much com-
pensation to an attorney in the event of settlement. The victims of
civil rights violations who incur predominantly non-pecuniary dam-
ages, such as victims of police misconduct who suffer from minor inju-
ries, are also unlikely to have high enough damages to attract an
attorney. These latter claims are also unlikely to be attractive to per-
sonal injury lawyers because of the low potential for recovery. For
these individuals, restrictions on civil rights attorneys' fees make the
promise of civil rights legislation more and more illusory.
10. Personal injury-type damages are the damages for tangible injuries awarded in
tort cases. Tort injuries usually consist of physical injury accompanied by emotional dis-
tress, or in some instances severe emotional harm alone. DAN B. DOBBS et al., PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs 359-60 (5th ed. 1984). Civil rights plaintiffs sometimes
have such damages but often do not. Where not otherwise defined by statute, damages in
federal civil rights actions are governed by federal common law derived from Anglo-Amer-
ican tort law. Carey, 435 U.S. at 257-58. See infra text accompanying notes 192-202.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 207-226.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 170-191.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 337-357.
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To enable the reader to follow the progression of the study, I be-
gin with a description of the work that has been done by others
describing civil rights litigation' 4 and explain the questionnaire that I
developed to conduct the study.'5 Because the central mission of the
project was to ascertain the effects of certain Supreme Court decisions
on the practice of civil rights law, I then describe in depth each of the
cases I asked about and follow that description with a summary of
participant responses.' 6 Having presented the data in sufficient depth
to reveal the bases for my subsequent evaluations, I examine factors
other than Supreme Court decisions which, in the view of practition-
ers, influence the types of cases in which they are willing to agree to
represent potential plaintiffs.17
I then proceed to evaluate information about the lawyers them-
selves-their motivations, aspirations, level of job satisfaction and pri-
orities-in light of commonly held assumptions about civil rights
lawyers.' 8 Civil rights lawyers are sometimes characterized by defense
attorneys as greedy maximizers of their own self-interest and by criti-
cal legal theorists as unwitting pawns in a high stakes game intended
to maintain the status quo.' 9 These critiques demand attention and
14. See infra text accompanying notes 21-30.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 31-36.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 38-226.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 257-282.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 283-319.
19. Critical theorists have become increasingly critical of people who believe that an-
tidiscrimination legislation will eventually remedy the effects of racism in society. Some
academic literature characterizes people who still believe the effects of a racial caste sys-
tem and long-standing discrimination against minorities can be addressed by civil rights
legislation as "classical liberals." The authors of a recent civil rights casebook distinguish
between classical liberals, who believe formal, equal-opportunity law is a necessary and
sufficient basis for addressing societal discrimination, and legal reformists, who believe the
traditional application of formal equal opportunity is flawed, even if it is conceptually
sound. Roy L. BRooKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION, CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 10-
14 (1995) [hereinafter BROOKS ET AL.]. See also Roy L. BRooKS, RETmNKING THE AMER-
ICAN RACE PROBLEM (1989).
Critical race theorist Richard Delgado describes classical liberals as those who "ac-
cept[ ] the dominant paradigm of civil rights scholarship and activism, and urge[ ] that we
work harder-litigate more furiously, press for new legislation, exhort each other even
more fervently than ever before-within that paradigm." Richard Delgado, Enormous
Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing About Race, 91 COLUM. L. R~v. 1547,
1547-48 (1991). Some critical theorists believe that by adherence to a myth of rights, liber-
als (including civil rights lawyers) exaggerate the changes lawyers and civil rights litigation
can bring about and interfere with political mobilization that might more effectively bring
about social change. See STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE




resolution as a prerequisite to proposing any type of reform intended
to perpetuate and increase civil fights litigation. Finally, I conclude
the Article by identifying the aspects of existing law that, on the basis
of this study, merit serious consideration and reform.20
H. A Description of the Study
The landscape of federal civil rights litigation differs depending
on who you ask to describe it-academics, judges, defense lawyers or
plaintiffs' lawyers. Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab, co-au-
thors of several studies examining reality and myth about constitu-
tional tort litigation,21 documented judges' perceptions that federal
constitutional tort litigation - is an area of law where the number of
claims is rapidly increasing and comprising an ever greater portion of
their dockets.23 Based on empirical studies, including district court
and appellate court filings, as well as appellate opinions, Eisenberg
and Schwab showed that the numbers did not support the judges' im-
pressions.24 Although they did not dismiss the views of appellate or
district court judges, Eisenberg and Schwab suggested that judges'
perceptions of the enormity of constitutional tort litigation may be
influenced by the different and somewhat conflicting sources of infor-
20. See infra text accompanying notes 320-363.
21. Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Fed-
eral Court System? 56 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 501 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Schwab, Percep-
tions]; Stewart J. Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort
Litigation: The Influence of the Attorneys Fees Statute and the Government as Defendan4 73
CORNELL L. Rv. 719 (1988) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Schwab, Explaining Constitutional
Tort Litigation]; Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional
Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. Rav. 641 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality
of Constitutional Tort Litigation].
22. The authors define constitutional tort litigation as civil actions brought against
state and local officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and civil actions brought against federal
officials based on Bivens v. Six Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). Eisenberg & Schwab, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation, supra note 21, at
720 n.1.
23. Eisenberg & Schwab, Perceptions, supra note 21, at 501-02; Eisenberg & Schwab,
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, supra note 21, at 646-50.
24. Eisenberg & Schwab, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation, supra note 21, at
721-22. In fact, the study finds a decline in constitutional tort filings relative to other civil
filings after the effective date of the Fees Act and finds that that decline cannot easily be
explained by changes in the law. Id. at 780. But see Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in
the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Cour4 Congress and Statutory Fees, 69 TEx. L. REv.
291, 362-63 (1990) [hereinafter Brand, Statutory Fees] (stating that the passage of the Fees
Act resulted in dramatic increases in the volume of civil rights litigation but that such
litigation has decreased in response to Supreme Court decisions).
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mation about that type of litigation.25 These indicators may not pres-
ent an accurate picture. Eisenberg and Schwab's work suggests that
constitutional tort litigation is nowhere near as burdensome or expen-
sive as federal judges perceive it to be.26 As Eisenberg explains, dur-
ing the 1970's and early 1980's, when concern about the volume of
federal civil rights cases was enormous, civil rights filings were not an
increasing portion of the federal docket.27
On the other hand, data exist that seem to indicate civil rights
litigation is exploding. Private employment discrimination claims, as
measured by filings in all federal courts, have greatly increased from
344 in 1970 to 15,965 in 1994.28 Similarly, the number of prisoner
claims filed has greatly increased-the vast majority being pro se-
notwithstanding the low success rate of prisoner litigation.29 Eisen-
berg's most recent calculations show an increase in the numbers of
general civil rights filings in the 1990's to over 35% of the federal
docket in 1994.30 One could look at the numerical data and conclude
25. They suggest that "different stages in federal court litigation lead to different im-
pressions of the volume and nature of federal litigation." An observer of published opin-
ions at the appellate level would have a very different impression of the volume of non-
prisoner constitutional tort litigation than would an observer at the district court level.
Eisenberg & Schwab, Perceptions, supra note 21, at 504.
26. ld. at 510-30 (concluding that the number of appeals in constitutional tort cases
approximated the number of appeals in tort cases; that constitutional tort litigation is not
inherently more difficult than other types of litigation; that, on appeal, constitutional tort
plaintiffs are less successful than other plaintiffs; that at the district level constitutional tort
litigation fares worse than most other litigation in almost every respect). See also Theo-
dore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases,
77 GEo. LJ. 1567, 1588 (1989) (finding a 37% success rate nationwide in civil rights cases
during the years 1978-1985).
27. THEODORE EISENBERo, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 9
(4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION].
28. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts 202 (1976) & Table C-2 (1994).
29. Comments of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Congressional Press Release, Federal Document
Clearinghouse, Apr. 26, 1996 ("In 1994, over 39,000 civil rights suits were filed by inmates
in federal courts, a staggering 15 percent increase over the number filed the previous
year."); Howard Mintz, The Paper From the Pen, Ttm RECORDER, July 25, 1995, at 1 (in
1966, the U.S. Administrative Office of the Courts counted 218 prisoner civil rights actions
in the entire federal system; during the first six months of 1995, prisoners had filed 612 civil
rights actions in the Northern District of California alone); Henry J. Reske, Study Reveals
Surge in Prisoner Appeals: Combined with Civil Rights Claims, They Continue to Dominate
Appellate Dockets, 81 A.B.A. J. 22,22 (Nov. 1995) (in 1993, civil rights appeals from pris-
oners and other civil rights litigants comprised 60% of the Federal Appeals Courts' dock-
ets, compared to 38% in 1977. Prison appeals constitute the bulk of this increase, with a
growth rate of 400% between 1977 and 1993). Prisoner claims are likely to decrease dra-
matically in the future due to passage of The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-34, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). See infra note 174.
30. EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION, supra note 27, at 9.
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that private enforcement of federal civil rights legislation has never
been better. Some might even conclude that civil rights legislation is
too successful.
Although the numerical data and the empirical studies by Eisen-
berg and Schwab transcend purely theoretical predictions, and thus
are immensely helpful in assessing the pulse of civil rights litigation,
the numbers and tables only go so far. Another view of the landscape
of civil rights litigation can be found in the practice experiences of the
attorneys who, on a daily basis, litigate federal civil rights claims.
While the perceptions and strategies of these lawyers do not yield nu-
merical data about the cases in the legal system and their dispositions,
they offer other critical information about the state of private enforce-
ment of civil rights laws.
A. Methodology
The survey that I undertook seeks to answer questions about the
viability of federal civil rights litigation by developing data that cannot
be found in public records or judicial opinions. I utilized a case-study
design consisting of interviews based on a questionnaire. Through a
series of interviews with thirty-five practitioners in all types of federal
civil rights practice, I sought to assess factors that affect the willing-
ness of attorneys to undertake civil rights litigation and their ability to
make a living at it. In all, I requested interviews with forty-five indi-
viduals, and thirty-five granted me an interview.
Most of the attorneys I interviewed practice law in the San Fran-
cisco Bay area. An active and diverse civil rights bar practices there.
I selected participants through use of state bar association referrals,
referrals from attorney participants, and lists of attorney panels. I did
not know any of the attorneys that I interviewed. As it turned out, the
attorneys represented a range of practice settings, including nonprofit
and private firms, as well as solo practitioners, offices of moderate size
and large firms with groups that do civil rights work. Some partici-
pants are highly successful monetarily and some are struggling to
survive.
I created the questionnaire with the assistance of Professor Har-
vey Williams of the University of the Pacific Sociology Department.
3 1
The questionnaire was fifteen pages long and consisted of both yes/no
and open-ended questions and response sheets to be completed by the
31. Professor Williams consulted with me. However, I had ultimate discretion as to
the questionnaire's contents.
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interview participants. It soon became clear, however, that partici-
pants were unwilling to spend the time filling out the sections of the
instrument that required them to rate the strength of their response
on a Likert scale,32 and thus, all data was gathered from the interview.
Both plaintiff and defense lawyers were asked the same questions with
minor changes in wording reflecting their differing litigation postures.
The interviews lasted about an hour and in some instances several
hours depending upon the interest of the respondent. Because the
primary goal of the study was to assess the viability of civil rights liti-
gation, most of the attorneys interviewed represent civil rights plain-
tiffs. A small number of defense attorneys were included to
counterbalance the plaintiffs' attorneys' views about the effects of par-
ticular cases and as a means of understanding more fully the motives
and strategies that shape civil rights litigation. Nonetheless, the infor-
mation collected largely reflects the experiences of plaintiffs' lawyers.
In addition to California attorneys, I also interviewed attorneys in
Idaho and Florida. Because the study deals with federal civil rights
legislation and federal cases, I began with the assumption that attor-
neys practicing federal civil rights law should have similar experiences
no matter where they practice. However, because states have differ-
ent state civil rights legislation, the effects of certain Supreme Court
decisions may be more pronounced in one state than another.33
32. A Likert scale is a statement, made in either a positive or negative manner, fol-
lowed by several categories of answers. The respondents are asked to check one category
from among several that best represent their feelings or belief in the statement. JAMES E.
VENEY & ARNOLD D. KALuzNY, EVALUATION AND DECISION MAKING FOR HEALTH
SERVICES 334 (2d ed. 1991).
33. For example, California state law still allows enhanced risk multipliers, which give
courts the discretion to adjust attorneys fee awards upward or downward. CAL. CWV. PROC.
CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996). RICHARD M. PEARL, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY
FEE AwARDs §§ 13.1, 13.2 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1996). The California legislature amended
the statute in 1993 to eliminate enhancement in suits by government entities against other
government entities but left multipliers intact in other areas. Id. at § 13.3. Federal law, as
described below, has greatly restricted the availability of such enhancements. See infra text
accompanying notes 150-164. Thus, in areas covered by California legislation, such as em-
ployment discrimination, the lack of a multiplier on a federal level has little significance.
Also, in many states, there is no state counterpart to section 1988 that expressly entitles
plaintiffs in state constitutional litigation to recover their attorneys fees. John M. Baker,
The Minnesota Constitution as a Sword: The Evolving Private Cause of Action, 20 WM.
MrrCHELL L. REv. 313, 334-35 (1994). As Baker points out, even if the state provides
broader protection than is available under the United States Constitution, plaintiffs will be
put to a tough choice if attorneys' fees are not provided. Id.; see also JENNIFER FRIESEN,
STATE CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES
10.02, 10.04 (1993). Another option that may be available to plaintiffs in states without
attorneys' fees statutes is to file a federal claim and a state claim in state court. State and
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 actions. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FED-
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The major limitations of the study include possible bias due to the
interactiveness of the interview format and small sample size. In an
interview context, interactiveness between the interviewer and re-
spondent always creates potential bias problem.34 I used the question-
naire during the interview to try to protect against interactiveness by
ensuring that the same questions were asked in the same way. Fur-
ther, the sample size is small, particularly when one considers the wide
variety of practice areas of the attorneys interviewed. Thus, the con-
clusions drawn are not statistically significant.
35
The strength of the study method is that the interview format al-
lows for in-depth information-gathering about each practitioner.
From the interview format, one can glimpse the inner workings of civil
rights practice and understand what factors attorneys consider as they
decide whether to accept or reject cases and whether to advise settle-
ment or trial. The interview format permits examination of the rea-
sons certain decisions are made. This data is difficult to derive from
other sources. Because the respondents were given the opportunity to
respond to open-ended questions, their answers are varied and indi-
vidualized. Nonetheless, certain themes emerge and, given the broad
representation of practice areas and settings, the study produced a
fairly well-rounded picture of civil rights practice in the 1990's. I con-
sider this study to be an initial study in that, on the basis of my re-
search, I reach some tentative conclusions that could be explored and
verified in a future study.
36
B. Content
The questions elicited several types of information: background
facts regarding the participant's length and range of practice experi-
ence; perception of demand by potential clients for representation and
ERAL Civn RiGHTs Acts § 14.09 [1] (3d ed. 1996). This strategy may, however, lead to
removal to federal court.
34. VENEY & KALUZNY, supra note 32, at 120.
35. The size of the population being surveyed is undetermined. Given the oral format
of the study, with each participant interviewed for approximately one hour, it would be
extraordinarily time consuming to gain a sample of the population large enough to obtain
statistically significant information. In addition, responses to the questions differed enough
within different subspecialties of civil rights law, at least as to some issues, that one would
need to survey groups within each specialty separately to obtain a truly significant re-
sponse. See generally EARL BABBIE, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS (2d ed. 1990).
36. VENEY & KALUZNY, supra note 32, at 119 (describing case study method and
stating that a case study can serve as a good source of initial information that may prove
sufficient for decision-making or may provide the basis for further study through a moni-
toring system or survey research).
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assessment of likelihood that potential clients with claims appearing
meritorious would obtain representation by counsel; effects of
Supreme Court cases affecting fee awards and settlement on respon-
dent's practice and perception of effect of such cases on practitioners
generally; methods by which practitioners have adapted to decisions
that have affected their practice; and other factors that would influ-
ence the respondent's willingness to represent a civil rights litigant.3 7
The names of the participants in the study are confidential. Their
responses are cited by reference to an interview number assigned to
the file.
III. The Effects of Supreme Court Decisions Regarding
Attorneys' Fees and Damages on Federal Civil Rights
Practice
This section contains the information that study participants pro-
vided regarding the effects of particular Supreme Court rulings on
their practices. I begin with a general background section explaining
the role of attorneys' fees in federal civil rights litigation. The discus-
sion then turns to the specific rulings that were the subject of the
study. First, I provide a description of the Court's decision, and dis-
cuss how it was predicted to affect civil rights practice. Then, I sum-
marize the participants' responses.
The basic premise underlying this study is that, in most instances,
attorney compensation drives decisions about what cases will be taken
and what cases will not be pursued.38 Although many attorneys do
pro bono work, attorneys who want to practice civil rights law must be
37. I specifically enumerated some other factors, such as the difficulty of establishing
a prima facie case due to substantive law, low damages, or unsympathetic juries. I also
allowed the participants to volunteer others I had not mentioned.
38. The validity of this premise is subject to debate, but I believe it is generally true.
Congress agreed when it enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). Numerous commentators have expressed the view that the availabil-
ity of attorneys' fees is equally as important as the substantive law. Brand, Statutory Fees,
supra note 24, at 296 (1990) ("The value of statutes and case law protecting substantive civil
rights is only as great as the plaintiffs' ability to secure competent counsel."); Ray Terry,
Eliminating the Plaintiffs Attorney in Equal Employment Litigation: A Shakespearean
Tragedy, 5 Tim LAB. LAW. 63, 63 (1989) ("The single most significant development in equal
employment law has been the erosion of the ground from under plaintiffs' counsel, particu-
larly in the area of a prevailing plaintiff's recovery of attorneys' fees.") See also WASBY,
supra note 19, at 55, 96-97 (noting that after enactment of the Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, "attorneys' fees as a proportion of litigating groups' budgets increased and re-
counting the experience of firms that have had to reject potentially good cases.., because
of the economy and because the courts have not lived up to expectations in implementing
the Civil Rights Fee Act"). Certainly we assume that lawyers handling non-civil rights
able to earn a living. Thus, attorney compensation issues are central
to gaining an understanding of how private enforcement works in ad-
dressing the problems that civil rights legislation was meant to tackle.
When Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976,39 the intent of the legislation was to encourage private
attorneys to undertake representation of civil rights plaintiffs, and
Congress thought that attorneys' fees would provide the needed in-
centive.40 This legislative modification of the "American Rule ' 41
cases act on the basis of fees and potential fees, and it does not seem unrealistic to assume
the same about civil rights lawyers.
Those who disagree with the premise might do so on the basis that it is difficult to
predict or even measure the effect of rules on behavior. See Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The
Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAW & Soc'y Rv. 251, 253-55 (1985).
Alternatively, one might argue that it is possible to verify the effect of the Fees Act and
that the Fees Act has not led to an increase in claims. In their 1987 and 1988 studies,
Eisenberg and Schwab did not find evidence that "fee awards in civil rights cases are
higher or more common than in non-civil rights cases." Eisenberg and Schwab, Reality of
Constitutional Tort Litigation, supra note 21, at 688-89 (1987); Eisenberg & Schwab, Ex-
plaining Constitutional Tort Litigation, supra note 21, at 755-61 (1988).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). Section 1988(b) provides: "Attorney's fees. In any ac-
tion or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and
1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or section 13981 of this title, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as part of the costs."
40. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d sess. 1 at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5908,5909. ("It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under
S. 2278 be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex
Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases and not be reduced because the rights involved
may be non-pecuniary in nature... . These cases have resulted in fees which are adequate
to attract competent counsel, but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys"); H.R. Rep.
No. 1558, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 at 9 (1976) reprinted in Source Book at 209, 217 ("The
application of these standards will insure that reasonable fees are awarded to attract com-
petent counsel in cases involving civil and constitutional rights, while avoiding windfalls to
attorneys. The effect of H.R. 15460 will be to promote the enforcement of the federal civil
rights acts, as Congress intended, and to achieve uniformity in those statutes and justice for
all citizens.")
41. The "American Rule" requires litigants to bear their own costs. The rule was
stated in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). Prior to the passage of the Fees
Act of 1976, American courts had fashioned several ways that poor plaintiffs with meritori-
ous cases could bypass the American Rule and recover their attorney's fees. These in-
cluded the "common fund" theory, which permitted the award of fees to a litigant who
successfully preserved or recovered a common fund for a class of citizens; the "bad faith"
exception, which allowed courts to levy a fine of the opposing party's attorney's fees on a
party who had proceeded in bad faith either prior to or during litigation; and the private
attorney general theory, which shifted liability for the plaintiff's attorney's fees to the de-
fendant when the plaintiff succeeded in conferring a benefit upon the class. Margaret An-
nabel de Lisser, Comment, Giving Substance to the Bad Faith Exception to Evans v. Jeff D.:
A Reconciliation of Evans with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 136 U.
PA. L. REv. 553, 555-56 (1987).
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made attorneys' fees available to prevailing plaintiffs42 who brought
suit under a number of civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. section
1983,43 which dates from the Reconstruction era, and more modem
legislation, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.44 Other
modem civil rights legislation, such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 45
Title VII,46 and the Americans with Disabilities Act,47 specifically au-
thorizes attorneys' fees awards under provisions contained in those
statutes. While the Reconstruction era civil rights statutes differ
greatly from modem civil rights statutes,48 the economic viability of
litigation under these statutes coalesces to the extent that suits under
both types of statutes are financed by awards of attorneys' fees paid
by losing defendants. In addition, the case law interpreting the Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act has been applied to the other statutory fee-
shifting provisions.4
9
Over the years, since Congress enacted the Attorney's Fees
Awards Act, the Supreme Court has decided many cases dealing with
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act was enacted in response to the Supreme
Court decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975),
which held that the federal courts required specific statutory authority if they were to con-
tinue their prior practice of awarding attorneys' fees using a private attorney general the-
ory for cases brought under federal civil rights statutes.
42. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act states that a prevailing "party" may
be awarded fees. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Act to mean that pre-
vailing plaintiffs should ordinarily be granted fees and prevailing defendants should ordina-
rily not receive fees. See Christiansberg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-19
(1978).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994)
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1994). The Americans with Disabilities Act fee provision dif-
fers from the Attorney's Fees Awards Act in that it permits recovery of litigation expenses
and costs by the prevailing party.
48. The Reconstruction era statutes are extremely broad in language and lack much
detail. The Supreme Court has interpreted the language of the statutes, in light of their
legislative history and policy, so as to make them usable by modern litigants. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (concluding 42 U.S.C. § 1982 extends to dis-
crimination against African-Americans by private property owners as well as by public
authorities). The modern legislation is far more detailed in every respect, including de-
tailed enforcement mechanisms and administrative remedial schemes. See, e.g., The Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
49. Brand, Statutory Fees, supra note 24, at 305-06 (1990). Professor Brand notes that
following the decision in Alyeska, Congress enacted many fee-shifting statutes. The Fees
Act of 1976 was the most important of these statutes because Congress passed it in direct
response to Alyeska, with an extensive legislative history. In addition, it applies to a broad
swath of cases and has been the subject of most of the Supreme Court cases interpreting
federal fee-shifting statutes.
attorneys' fees in civil rights cases, and in recent years, the Court has
increased the number of cases it hears dealing with fees, rendering
decisions on discrete issues.50 Although the Court has furthered fee
awards in unanimous or nearly unanimous opinions in some in-
stances,5' other decisions reveal deep divisions between the justices
and have resulted in majority rulings that seem at odds with Congress'
intent to encourage attorneys to take civil rights cases.5 2 The deci-
sions discussed in this Article5 3 are those that seemingly jeopardize
the availability of attorneys' fees in federal civil rights actions. Schol-
ars and commentators have predicted that such cases would bring civil
rights litigation to a grinding halt.5 4 Among the civil rights practition-
ers I interviewed, these cases are widely, almost universally, recog-
nized.55 Knowing in theory the impact these decisions would have, I
designed a study to evaluate whether they have affected the willing-
ness and ability of attorneys to undertake federal civil rights litigation.
Rules on damages and the relationship between the relief a plain-
tiff receives and an award of statutory attorney's fees are the other
areas of law that directly influence attorney compensation in federal
civil rights actions. The relief a plaintiff will obtain in any given civil
rights action depends on any statutory limitations on remedies5 6 and
50. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Supreme Court on Attorney Fee Awards, 1985 and 1986
Terms: Economics, Ethics and Ex Ante Analysis, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETMiCS 621, 621, 632-36
(1988) (noting the increase in attorneys' fees cases on the Court's docket and arguing that
the Court's decisions during the 1985 and 1986 terms lacked economic sophistication and
that the Court could benefit from a more sophisticated economic analysis of the effects of
its fee-shifting decisions); see also Brand, Statutory Fees, supra note 24, at 316 (a "well-
defined body of case law" exists).
51. Brand, Statutory Fees, supra note 24, at 340 (concluding, for example, that there is
unanimity that a party who prevails on a significant issue in the litigation may attain pre-
vailing party status and near-unanimity that counsel must be compensated for work per-
formed in mandatory administrative proceedings).
52. Brand, Statutory Fees, supra note 24, at 343-44; Rowe, supra note 50, at 637-39;
Marjorie A. Silver, Evening the Odds: The Case for Attorney's Fee Awards for Administra-
tive Resolution of Title VI and Title VII Disputes, 67 N.C. L. REv. 379, 381 (1989) (criticiz-
ing the Supreme Court's denial of fees in a case involving a successful administrative
challenge under Title VI and arguing its inconsistency with the goals of civil rights legisla-
tion); Greenhouse, A Changed Court Revises Rules on Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
1989, § 4 at 1 col. 1 (concluding that recent Supreme Court decisions make discrimination
cases harder to bring and to win, and more vulnerable to attack).
53. While conceivably other decisions could have been included, I derived my list
from research and from a pre-interviewing process in which I elicited feedback from practi-
tioners to help me formulate the questions I would include.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 78-78; 134-137; & 162-164.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 82-126; 138-149; 165-191; & 207-226.
56. The modem civil rights statutes are much more specific regarding remedies than
the Reconstruction era statutes. For example, Title VII provides that "[i]f the court finds
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on Supreme Court decisions that interpret how damages will be calcu-
lated in civil rights actions.5 7 Where the remedy sought and received
is damages, the Court has said that statutory awards of fees need not
be proportional to the damages a plaintiff obtains.58 A recent decision
suggests the Court may retreat from that rule in the future, thereby
diminishing the incentives for attorneys to take cases where damages
are low. 59 The damages rules also greatly influence the settlement
value of cases. Because Supreme Court decisions provide a strong
incentive to settle cases (and in fact settlement is a common resolution
of civil rights actions),60 I have sought to understand how the damages
rules affect settlement, as well as how they may ultimately affect
court-ordered fees.
A. Waivers of Attorneys' Fees in Settlement
The first case I asked practitioners about was Evans v. Jeff D.61
In Jeff D., the Supreme Court held that waivers of attorneys' fees in
that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may
be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employ-
ees, with or without back pay... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Based on this language, Title VII had always been construed
to preclude compensatory and punitive damages. SMOLLA, supra note 33, at § 9.10 [1].
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 permits compensatory and punitive damages in cases of inten-
tional discrimination. See infra note 135.
57. The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of damages awards under § 1983 is
to compensate for actual injuries, not abstract harm. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307. However,
actual injury includes emotional distress and humiliation if these result from the violation.
Carey, 435 U.S. at 254. Stachura has been applied in a Fair Housing Act case. Baum-
gardner v. HUD, 960 F.2d 572, 581-83 (6th Cir. 1992).
58. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
59. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115-16 (1992).
60. Eisenberg & Schwab's research indicates that non-prisoner constitutional tort ac-
tions settled at a 45% rate in the three districts they studied, although prisoner constitu-
tional tort actions settled at a 17% rate. The control group cases settled at a 73% rate.
EISENBERG, Civn. RiGrrs LE-GISLTION, supra note 27, at 538-39. Employment attorneys
view settlement as a likely outcome, particularly in lawsuits against certain types of defend-
ants. Interviews 1, 2, 3, & 24. Available data suggest their perceptions are accurate. Pro-
fessor Michael Selmi has examined the statistics and concluded that the settlement rate in
cases filed by the private bar is 60-65%. Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexam-
ining the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 Omo ST. L.J. 1, 14 (1996).
Other studies report the range may vary between 35-80%, depending on which cases are
studied. See ag., Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue M, The Selection of Employment
Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein
Hypothesis, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 427,450 (1995) (61.3%-84.6% depending on the time the case
was filed).
61. 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
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connection with settlement negotiations between a civil rights plaintiff
and a defendant were not inconsistent with the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.62 In the case, the attorney for a plain-
tiff class of disabled children was asked one week before trial to waive
statutory attorneys' fees as part of a settlement negotiation in which
the class was granted virtually all of the injunctive relief that they re-
quested in their complaint. 63 Because the settlement was so favorable
to his clients, the attorney agreed,6 but then asked the district court
to award fees despite the settlement.65 The court refused,66 and Idaho
Legal Aid appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit reversed
the lower court and announced a per se rule prohibiting the simulta-
neous negotiation of the merits and fees in a civil rights action.67 The
Ninth Circuit believed that, except in unusual circumstances, the par-
ties should first agree to relief on the merits and then discuss the issue
of fees.68 The Ninth Circuit stated that a stipulated waiver of all attor-
ney's fees obtained solely as a condition for obtaining relief for the
class should not be accepted by the court.69
Meanwhile, other federal Courts of Appeal were split on the is-
sue. The Third Circuit,70 for example, had prohibited simultaneous
negotiation of merits and fees because it feared that attorneys would
be enticed into recommending that clients accept an inadequate settle-
ment offer accompanied by a high fee award. The D.C. Circuit, in
contrast, believed that a plaintiff should have the option of voluntarily
relinquishing attorneys' fees in return for a favorable settlement of-
fer.71 The D.C. Circuit believed, however, that the district court
should be required to approve or deny the use of any fee waiver and
state the reasons for its decision.72
Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Jeff D. accepted the rationale
that fee waivers would ultimately promote settlements, thereby assist-
62. Id. at 737-38.
63. Id. at 722.
64. Id. at 722-23.
65. Id. at 723.
66. Id.
67. Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit invalidated the
fee waiver and left standing the remainder of the settlement, instructing the District Court
to make a determination of reasonable fees. Id. at 652.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Cir. 1977); see also City of
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
71. Moore v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 762 F.2d 1093, 1105 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
72. Id. at 1106.
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ing civil rights enforcement, and concluded that the Fees Act does not
preclude settlements conditioned on waivers of attorneys' fees.73 Ac-
knowledging that Rule 23(e) requires court approval of the terms of
any settlement of a class action, the Court held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in upholding a fee waiver which secured
broad injunctive relief for the plaintiffs.74 Justice Brennan, dissenting
in Jeff D., predicted that the decision would jeopardize the willingness
of attorneys to undertake civil rights litigation.75 Unlike the majority,
who perceived no conflict between an attorney and a client con-
fronted with a settlement offer containing a request for a waiver of
fees,76 Brennan urged state and local bar associations to declare the
practice unethical.77
Commentators echoed the concerns of Justice Brennan, predict-
ing that requests for waivers of fees would become common and lead
to the demise of civil rights litigation.78 Practitioners in the public in-
terest area perceived an immediate threat and viewed Jeff D. as "an
73. Jeff D., 475 U.S. at 738 n.30.
74. Id. at 738-39, 742-43.
75. 1I at 755-59.
76. The majority reasoned that attorneys owe an undivided loyalty to their clients,
and that, accordingly, they would have an ethical obligation to recommend a settlement
favorable to the client even if it contained a fee waiver. Id. at 727-28 & 728 n.14.
77. Id. at 765.
78. The first commentary reached law reviews shortly after the Court's decision. See,
e.g., Debra Watts McCormick, The Effect of Evans v. Jeff D. on Civil Rights Litigation, 12
OKLA. CnTy U. L. REv. 415, 416 (1987) (urging legislation to prohibit use of waivers); F.
Allen Phaup II, Evans v. Jeff D., Putting the Squeeze on Private Attorneys' General, 9 GEo.
MASON U. L. REv. 389, 408-09 (1987) (concluding that Jeff D. indicates the Supreme
Court's support for coerced fee waivers and has the potential to "impair... the future
ability of many aggrieved individuals to find counsel willing to represent them and thereby
undermining the enforcement of the nation's civil rights laws"); Ellege, Note, Evans v. Jeff
D.: No Judicial Prohibition of Coerced Waivers of Attorney's Fees Under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 24 HOUSTON L. REv. 1021, 1022 (1987) (joining other
commentators who believe Jeff D. will impair the effectiveness of the private enforcement
scheme Congress established) (citing Evans v. Jeff D. 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1557 (1986)).
Later articles by prominent writers in the area of attorneys' fees continue to view Jeff
D. as a case of extraordinary significance. Charles Silver contends that the case marked
the Supreme Court's official rejection of a restitutionary theory, which would justify a fee
award to the attorney on the basis that allowing class relief without payment of fees consti-
tutes unjust enrichment. The Court also rejected the central premise of an economic the-
ory which posits that lawyers respond to the incentives of attorneys' fees. Silver goes on to
say that in order to reach its decision in Jeff D., the Court had to reject the central premise
of the economic theory: that lawyers respond to incentives. Charles Silver, A Restitution-
ary Theory of Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNErL L. Rnv. 656, 666-61 (1991);
Brand, Statutory Fees, supra note 24, at 326-29 (Jeff D. and Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
(1985), have generated the most controversy of any of the Supreme Court's attorneys' fees
decisions).
January 1997]
ominous cloud on the court-awarded attorney fee horizon. ' 79 In some
states, bar associations sought, without success, to make simultaneous
negotiation of fees and merits unethical.8 0 The Civil Rights Act of
1990, vetoed by President Bush, included a provision which would
have overruled Jeff D. in Title VII actions.81
I asked plaintiff practitioners whether they had received requests
for partial or complete fee waivers, and what strategies, if any, they
had developed to blunt the possibility that such requests would result
in non-payment or very low payment of their fees. I asked defense
79. Charles F. Elsesser, Jr., California's Response to Evans v. Jeff D., 23 C.AMrNG-
HOUSE REv. 951, 953 (Dec. 1989); Neil M. Goldstein, Comment, Preserving Fee-Shifting
After Evans v. Jeff D.: Joint Attorney/Client Control of Settlements, 11 INDUs. REL. L.J. 267,
281-82 (1989) (arguing that Jeff D. will undermine the intent of fee-shifting statutes and
erode enforcement of civil rights statutes). See also Opinion 1987-4, of the Comm. on Prof.
and Jud. Ethics of the N.Y. City Bar Ass'n, in N.Y.L.., May 22, 1987, at 33 (expressing a
dissenting view predicting that fee waivers will create difficulties in settlement negotiations
and may thwart the settlement itself).
80. In California, for example, public interest attorneys, supported by many local bar
associations and by the California State Bar itself, forwarded to the California Supreme
Court for approval a proposed rule that prohibited settlement offers conditioned on oppos-
ing counsel waiving all or substantially all fees. That proposed rule was rejected by the
California Supreme Court without explanation. Elsesser, supra note 79, at 951-53. In
1987, the Ethics Committee of the Association of the Bar 11 of New York City reconsid-
ered a 1981 opinion in which it had determined that it was unethical for defense counsel to
propose a settlement agreement conditioned on waivers of attorneys' fees in actions
brought under statutes designed to encourage the enforcement of civil rights. After Jeff D.,
the committee stressed that it did not sanction the conduct it previously believed unethical,
but concluded that there was no binding ethical authority forbidding defense counsel from
asking for fee waivers. Op. 1987-4 of the Comm. on Prof. and Jud. Ethics of the N.Y. City
Bar Ass'n, N.Y.L.J., May 22, 1987, at 6.
81. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 was introduced as Senate Bill 2104 on February 7,
1990 by Senator Edward Kennedy. 136 CONG. REc. S1018 (1990). The provision relating
to waivers of attorneys' fees would have required "that courts entering consent decrees
settling job discrimination cases must first obtain from the parties and their counsel an
attestation that a waiver of attorneys' fees was not compelled as a condition of settlement."
IL at S1021. Jeff D. would have been addressed only in the context of Title VII actions.
The need to address Jeff D. was also addressed in hearings before the Education and Labor
Committee prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Committee heard a letter
from the Philadelphia Community Legal Services, which stated, "[m]ore and more, defend-
ants in civil rights cases purposely pit plaintiffs against their lawyer .... The loss per case
may be only a few hundred or a few thousand dollars, but over the course of time it repre-
sents a substantial drain of our extremely limited resources." Although the committee
found that Jeff D. would discourage plaintiffs' attorneys from taking Title VII cases, the
provision to address it was not enacted into law when the Civil Rights Act of 1991 passed.
See H.R. Rep. No. 40(I), 102nd Congress, 1st Sess. 84 (1991), reprinted in Act of Oct. 30,
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 549, 621-22. The Committee also
recommended overruling Marek v. Chesny, but this proposal likewise did not pass. Id. at
620. See infra text accompanying notes 127-149.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS PRACTICE IN THE 1990'S
practitioners whether they requested fee waivers, and whether the Jeff
D. decision influenced their settlement strategy.
In response to questions regarding the effects of the Supreme
Court's decision in Jeff D., and methods developed by attorneys to
reduce the risk of non-payment by reason of a waiver, a majority re-
ported that requests for fee waivers were not much of a problem in
their practice.s2 After Jeff D., attorneys very quickly developed fee
agreements with clients which offer some protection from waivers in
the form of financial disincentives. In addition to providing for attor-
ney payment on a contingent fee basis,83 some agreements provide
that if fees are waived in a settlement, the client must pay at the lode-
star rate for all the hours the attorney expended,8 4 or at 75% of lode-
star. Attorneys also discourage fee waivers by exercising caution in
client selection and by educating clients about the importance of fees
in a civil rights practice to prepare clients in the event of a settlement
offer contingent on a waiver.
Despite the absence of many requests for complete fee waivers,
some plaintiffs' attorneys reported being asked to waive fees and a
few had done so. Many more think about the possibility even though
they do not confront it routinely. In addition, the attorneys reported
that, even when waivers are not requested, the Court's JeffD. decision
has influenced settlement behavior. Specifically, the decision has af-
fected the leverage each party brings into negotiations, and, in the
process, has led parties to evaluate and negotiate civil rights actions as
they would personal injury actions in many instances. The problem
with this assimilation is that, because civil rights claims differ from
82. Interviews f-6, 8-20, 22 & 24-27. As I explained infra, JeffD., has had an impact
on civil rights practice, but it is not the same impact that commentators expected.
83. The Supreme Court has held that neither contingent fee agreements nor payment
of a contingent fee in excess of a statutory award of fees is inconsistent with the Fees Act.
Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 88-90 (1990). The Court stated that "Section 1988 con-
trols what the losing defendant must pay, not what the prevailing plaintiff must pay his
lawyer.... Section 1988 itself does not interfere with the enforceability of a contingent fee
contract." Id. at 90. See also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1989) (holding
that the existence of a contingency agreement does not limit what may be awarded a pre-
vailing party by the court).
84. The lodestar approach calculates the fee for each attorney and billable legal
worker by multiplying each person's "reasonable" hours by each person's "reasonable"
rate. The "reasonable" rate is based on the court's determination of the market rate for
attorneys or legal workers in the relevant community with comparable experience and
skill. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 895 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
433-34 (1983).
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personal injury claims in significant respects, some categories of civil
rights actions simply do not attract legal representationas
Thrning first to the instances in which waivers have been re-
quested, a number of attorneys noted that on rare occasions they have
been asked to waive fees completely. Usually they flatly refused.8 6
Participants in the study who had experienced requests for fee waivers
reported that such requests do not tend to come from many entity
defendants, such as the federal and state governments.87 Such entities
either have a policy against asking for total waivers, ss or are repre-
sented by attorneys who view such requests as unethical despite the
Supreme Court's statements in Jeff D. to the contrary. Some plain-
tiffs' counsel said that requests for waivers are more likely to come
from private defense counsel or counsel representing local public enti-
ties.89 The perception was that these attorneys often must answer to
clients who are unaccustomed to paying attorneys' fees awards.
Several attorneys reported waiving fees entirely to settle a case.90
The instances in which the waivers occurred tended to involve finan-
cially desperate clients or cases in which the attorney perceived the
chances of prevailing on the merits as no better than moderate.91 In
one instance, a legal services attorney was litigating a claim in an area
where the law had not been fully developed, and thus, the settlement
offered his client was too attractive to refuse.92
Although attorneys in non-profit organizations seldom place a
high priority on obtaining attorneys' fees, they are more vulnerable to
requests for waivers than for-profit attorneys. 93 It is difficult for non-
profit attorneys to protect themselves against requests for fee waivers
through contingency or other fee agreements because these agree-
85. See infra text accompanying notes 192-226.
86. In JeffD., the Supreme Court made clear that the decision whether to waive fees
belongs to the client. JeffD., 475 U.S. at 728 n.14. While many attorneys I spoke to recog-
nized this and emphasized that the choice remained with the client, several individuals
indicated they routinely informed the defendant they would not discuss settlement unless
fees were included. Interviews 4, 8 & 22.
87. Interviews 2, 11, 12 (stating that entity policies differ), 20 (stressing that although
the state attorney general's office does not seek waivers, it is very aggressive in negotiating
the amount of fees paid) & 29.
88. Elsesser, supra note 79, at 952 (noting that by 1987, the California Attorney Gen-
eral's office had already adopted internal attorney fee settlement guidelines that, as a rule,
eliminated the practice of seeking fee waivers from litigants against the state).
89. Interviews 5, 12 & 18.
90. Interviews 11, 17 & 20.
91. Interviews 3, 12 & 31.
92. Interview 11.
93. Interviews 1, 12 & 29.
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ments may imperil their tax-exempt status.94 Although some non-
profit attorneys utilize very limited contingency agreements and still
apparently maintain tax-exempt status,95 one attorney acknowledged
the organization had no agreement with clients and no protection
from waiver requests96 and others acknowledged that their type of or-
ganization had typically paid little attention to attorneys' fees at all.97
Whether or not a fee agreement is signed, attorneys who perceive
their clients as vulnerable to requests for waivers place heavy empha-
sis on client selection and education.98 Whether the client is commit-
ted to the case in principle is a factor they strongly consider. Often,
clients are educated regarding the necessity of attorneys' fees from the
start of the litigation and sign an acknowledgment that the litigation
would be impossible without fees.99
In my sample, attorneys practicing civil rights law outside the
context of non-profit organizations seem to have felt the effect of Jeff
D. largely in terms of a shift in negotiation and settlement strategy.100
Before Jeff D., attorneys could, and did, demand bifurcated negotia-
94. Interviews 20 & 29. Under the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974,42 U.S.C.
§§ 2996-29961 (1994), recipients of grants from the Legal Services Corporation are not per-
mitted to compete with private attorneys. Legal Services attorneys are authorized to rep-
resent clients in a fee generating case when other adequate representation is unavailable.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1609.1, 1609.2, 1609.3, 1609.4. Legal Services Corporation's General
Counsel Office has interpreted 45 C.F.R. § 1609.5 to allow legal service programs to retain
monies as fees only when fees are awarded in addition to compensatory relief. See Stephen
Yelenosky and Charles Silver, A Model Retainer Agreement for Legal Services Programs:
Mandatory Attorney Fee Provisions, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE RviEw 114, 118-19 (1994).
Under the 1996 amendments to the Legal Services Corporation Act, programs are pre-
cluded from representing clients under federal or state fee-shifting statutes, thus substan-
tially reducing the amount of fees that legal services programs can retain. See infra note
193. Attorneys in non-profit organizations not receiving Legal Services Corporation fund-
ing previously were not permitted to receive fees directly from clients for services ren-
dered. BRUCE R. HoPKINs, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 158 (6th ed.,
1992). In 1992, the Internal Revenue Service changed the tax-exempt status of public in-
terest law firms. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411, 411-12. However, public interest law
firms may not consider the likelihood or probability of a fee, whether court awarded or
client-paid, in selecting cases. Id. 92-59 § 4 (03) at 412. Once representation has begun,
the public interest firm cannot withdraw because of a litigant's inability to pay. ld. 92-59
§ 5 (02) at 412. The combination of these limitations makes non-profit law firms less able
to protect themselves from waivers than private attorneys. For a review of the 1992
changes affecting public interest law firms, see New Decisions: Public Interest Law Firms
May Accept Fees From Clients For Legal Services, 78 J. TAX'N 57, 57 (1993).
95. Interviews 11 & 12.
96. Interview 17.
97. Interviews 11 & 27.
98. Interview 1.
99. Interviews 12, 16 & 25.
100. Interviews 2, 6, 13, 17, 20, 21 & 29.
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tion of fees and merits, on the ground that to combine them would
place the plaintiff's attorney in an ethical dilemma.'01 When the
Supreme Court rejected that contention in Jeff D.,102 defense attor-
neys began to offer lump sums routinely,103 and, as is true in the per-
sonal injury context, division of the lump sum was left to the
discretion of lawyer and client. Many times, division of the lump sum
on a contingency basis in a civil rights action is the equivalent of a
partial waiver of fees, because the attorney is paid an amount much
lower than the number of hours expended on the case.
Some plaintiffs' attorneys stated that they have requested bifur-
cated negotiation of fees and merits since Jeff D., but these requests
are usually refused.104 The defense attorneys interviewed concurred
that they would make lump sum offers, 05 and would not agree to bi-
furcate negotiation of fees and merits.10 6 By offering a lump sum high
enough to be attractive to the plaintiff, defense attorneys can proceed
without worrying about how much of the recovery ultimately goes to
the plaintiff's attorney. 07 In contrast, several class action attorneys
report that they have bifurcated negotiation of fees and merits be-
cause the settlement must be approved by the court, and both sides
know that they have a better chance convincing the court that a settle-
ment is equitable if fees and merits have been discussed separately. 08
101. The contention was that the attorney might be tempted to trade off the client's
recovery in exchange for a greater fee award. See, e.g., Robert H. Pate III, Comment,
Evans v. Jeff D. and the Proper Scope of State Ethics Decisions, 73 VA. L. REv. 783,784-87
(1987); Steven M. Goldstein, Settlement Offers Contingent Upon Waiver of Attorney Fees: A
Continuing Dilemma After Evans v. Jeff D., 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 693, 694 (1986) (ar-
guing that Jeff D. creates at least two situations in which plaintiff counsel's financial inter-
est may conflict with the interest of the client); see supra notes 74-75.
102. Jeff D., 475 U.S. at 727-29.
103. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, CASES AND MATERIALS
884 (2d ed. 1994).
104. Interviews 13 & 15. But see interview 11 (state will honor requests for non-simul-
taneous negotiation).
105. Interviews 30-32.
106. Interviews 30 & 32.
107. Interview 32.
108. Interviews 1 & 19. Two circuits tried to require that an attorney for the class
negotiate -the class recovery, obtain court approval, and then negotiate attorneys' fees.
Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980) (class members appealed
District Court approval of a desegregation settlement plan that closed three schools.
Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court, the Ninth Circuit noted that "while
we strongly discourage the simultaneous negotiation of attorneys' fees and substantive is-
sues in class action settlement negotiations ... we do not believe rejection of a resulting
settlement in every case is appropriate") (citation omitted); Prandini v. National Tea Co.,
557 F.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that courts should insist upon settlement of the
damage aspect separately from award of statutorily authorized attorney's fees). While this
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Piecing together the comments of plaintiffs' attorneys, there was
sentiment that the pre-Jeff D. practice of bifurcating fees and merits
gave them a better hope of being paid an amount approximating the
hours expended than did a lump sum offer.10 9 Some noted that de-
spite the Supreme Court's ruling that lump sum offers do not place
attorneys in conflict with their clients, they perceive an ethical con-
flict. o10 Although one attorney had a client who deliberately plotted
to deprive him of any payment for his services,1 ' in most cases, clients
settle for the usual reasons: settlement seems a good option consider-
ing factors such as the risk of losing, the cost of trial, and the need for
money at the time the offer is made. Plaintiffs' attorneys stressed that
while taking part of the settlement proceeds on a contingency basis
works in the personal injury context, it is much less likely to lead to a
reasonable fee in civil rights cases, where the damages are often
lower.1 2
A number of plaintiffs' attorneys noted that in the event that a
low but feasible settlement offer were made and the client was in-
dined to accept, they would cut their fees below the amounts stipu-
lated in their retainer agreements to enhance the client's recovery.
11 3
One attorney explained that for years he had accepted reduced fees in
some cases, assuming it would eventually even out."i4 Several attor-
neys who routinely took less than the amount to which they would be
entitled in their fee agreement expressed doubts about how long they
would be able to continue to litigate for poor clients in low damages
cases. 115
The Supreme Court's opinion in Jeff D. justifies requests for fee
waivers on the ground that civil rights plaintiffs will benefit by settling
greater numbers of civil rights actions.116 This study did not measure
whether settlements do in fact occur more frequently now than before
has not become the rule, judicial approval of class action settlements can pose a check on
unethical sweetheart deals between plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants. In common fund
cases, attorneys' fees are based on a percentage of the fund. The Ninth Circuit has ap-
proved a benchmark of 25% of the total award to the class for attorney fees. In re Pacific
Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Six (6) Mexican Workers v.
Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990). The judge has the discretion
to increase or lower the percentage when special circumstances indicate. Id.
109. Interviews 13, 20 & 27.
110. Interviews 15, 16 & 18.
111. Interview 15.
112. Interviews 13 & 25.
113. Interviews 2, 5, 13 & 14.
114. Interview 14.
115. Interviews 13 & 14.
116. Jeff D., 475 U.S. at 732-33.
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Jeff D.117 It appears that in cases where settlement offers are made,
defendants enter the arena with newfound leverage. Given low dam-
ages and high litigation costs, plaintiffs' attorneys often recognize that
it is in the best interests of their clients, and indeed themselves, to
accept settlements that result in the attorney making an amount much
less than his or her hourly rate.118
Despite the apparent incentives to defense counsel to settle
claims, in certain practice areas, Jeff D. seems not to have spurred
plaintiffs' or defense attorneys to settle. In the police misconduct
area, for example, some plaintiffs' counsel claim that they have not
received reasonable settlement offers until right before trial, if at
all.' 19 A number of plaintiffs' attorneys perceive certain public entity
defendants as being unwilling to settle cases under any circum-
stances.120 Plaintiffs' attorneys offer a host of explanations for this
behavior. Private defense counsel, they say, have a personal interest
in prolonging litigation because their billable hours increase. They are
working for clients who expect to pay by the hour and to spend a lot
of money on fees. Attorneys who are directly employed by public
entities are said to be enmeshed in hierarchical bureaucracies where
political issues predominate, and business sense and honest legal ap-
praisal fall short. The defense attorneys interviewed confirmed that
settlements with certain public entities are extremely hard to achieve,
although they differ somewhat as to the reasons for this difficulty. A
city attorney acknowledged that institutional clients often have a
huge amount invested in maintaining an institutional structure in-
tact. 1 1 For some of these clients, settlements may be tantamount to
political suicide. The defense attorneys interviewed likewise con-
curred with plaintiffs' attorneys that some entities are so hierarchical
that achieving settlements is difficult and extremely time-consum-
ing.'2 Unlike plaintiffs' attorneys, however, the defense attorneys in-
terviewed also cited concerns such as discouraging non-meritorious
117. See supra note 58 for data regarding settlement rates generally.
118. Cases for low-wage earners are frequently as complex as cases for high-wage earn-
ers. Thus, when representing low-wage earners, an attorney can easily put in more hours
than the case is ultimately worth. When a low settlement offer is made, the client, who is
frequently strapped for cash, may consider the offer attractive. Unless the case is a sure
winner, the attorney may also view the settlement as a way of cutting the risk of loss, and
complete non-compensation, at trial. These factors make it impossible for a sensible em-
ployment lawyer to represent low-wage earners. Interview 13. See also interviews 3 & 21.
119. Interviews 15 & 18.
120. Interviews 3, 8, 10, 12, 14 & 20.
121. Interview 30.
122. Interviews 31 & 32.
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litigation or the need for caution when recommending the expenditure
of tax money, as reasons for failing to settle cases.123
Although the plaintiffs' attorneys found attorneys for private de-
fendants to be much more willing to negotiate than those representing
public entities, they still noted a reluctance to settle that seemed to
hurt, rather than further, the defendants' best interests. 24 One plain-
tiffs' attorney practicing employment law stated that sometimes de-
fendants seem to expect lawsuits no matter what they do and consider
them so much a cost of doing business that they do not even try to
distinguish a factually meritorious claim from a non-meritorious claim
until shortly before trial, when attorneys' fees and costs are astro-
nomical on each side. 25 The defense attorneys interviewed tell simi-
lar stories, featuring plaintiffs with unrealistic demands who refuse to
talk seriously or think creatively. 26 Both sides were careful not to
over-generalize or to stereotype, so the instances of complete refusal
to compromise should not be overemphasized. Nonetheless, the ex-
periences of practitioners referred to above reveal that despite the set-
tlement incentives the Court sought to give defendants in Jeff D., the
dynamics of the process at times remain completely untouched by the
decision.
Thus, my conclusion regarding the effect of Jeff D. is that fee
waivers remain a concern, if not a frequent reality, for non-profit or-
ganizations and that the major impact of the decision is felt largely in
the settlement context. Although the ability to make a lump sum of-
fer makes settlement unquestionably more attractive to defendants
than continuing to litigate, civil rights claims are now treated as the
equivalent of torts in the settlement process. Because of fundamental
differences between many civil rights claims and torts, however, some
potentially meritorious civil rights violations will not be as attractive
to lawyers as tort actions.
123. Interviews 30 & 32.
124. Interviews 13 (tough defense stance sometimes injures client), 18 (private counsel
string out litigation just to inflate own fees), 20 (despite greater sense of rationality in
private counsel, churning and protracted litigation exists) & 30 (counsel are beneficiaries
of protracted litigation because fees increase).
125. Interview 13.
126. Interviews 30 (plaintiffs with inflated expectations who refused to listen their at-
torneys), 31 (plaintiffs with inflated expectations) & 32 (plaintiffs bar unreasonable).
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B. Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees and Rule 68
Marek v. Chesny'27 is another case that, when decided, promised
to have a potentially large impact on civil rights practice. In Marek,
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who refuses a Rule 68 pretrial
settlement offer that is greater than the final judgment obtained after
trial will be denied all post-offer costs, including attorneys' fees under
fee-shifting statutes.128 Whereas in many types of litigation "costs" do
not include attorneys' fees, the Court in Marek construed the Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act to include attorneys' fees as part of costs.
129
Although the case applied specifically to fee awards under the Fees
Act, the reasoning has been applied by implication to numerous other
fee-shifting statutes that authorize attorneys' fee awards as an element
of costs.' 30
The Supreme Court's opinion in Marek expressed the view that
civil rights plaintiffs would benefit from the decision because defend-
ants would have an extra incentive to settle: the possibility of capping
plaintiffs' attorneys' fee claim as of the time a Rule 68 offer was re-
jected.' 31 Of course, this cap occurs only in the event that the plaintiff
fails to recover an amount more than the amount of the offer, and in
calculating the amount of the offer, courts include attorneys' fees as of
the date of the offer. 32 Thus, for a defendant, Rule 68 offers another
form of settlement leverage, provided an offer of the right amount is
made.133
After Marek was decided, commentators predicted that Rule 68
would provide a strong incentive for plaintiffs to accept settlement of-
fers in civil rights cases. The plaintiffs would be placed in the position
of having to assume the cost of post-offer fees even if they prevailed,
127. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
128. Id. at 11-12.
129. Id. at 8-10.
130. Id. at 23-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Congress has enacted well over 100 attor-
ney's fees statutes, many of which would appear to be affected by today's decision."). As
Justice Brennan pointed out, in a number of other fee shifting statutes, fees are distin-
guished from costs.
131. Id. at 10. The Court noted that Rule 68 favors neither plaintiffs nor defendants,
but that some civil rights plaintiffs would benefit because of the overall policy encouraging
settlement.
132. Marryshow v. Flynn, 986 F.2d 689, 692 (4th Cir. 1993); Corder v. Gates, 947 F.2d
374, 380-81 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1991); Grosvenor v. Brienen, 801 F.2d 944, 948 (7th Cir. 1986).
133. Professor Owen M. Fiss has challenged the legitimacy of the policy of promoting
settlement. He argues that incentives to settle, such as that embodied by Rule 68, are
highly problematic techniques for streamlining dockets, often at the expense of justice.
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1074-75 (1984).
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so long as the amount of the award did not exceed the Rule 68 of-
fer. 34 Thus, plaintiffs might potentially be deterred from prosecuting
claims that had the potential to expand civil rights protection when
such claims were not clearly going to prevail or to result in a predict-
able monetary award.135 In addition, Rule 68 offers might be made at
such an early date in litigation that plaintiffs might be led to make
uninformed settlement decisions. 136 Thus, the consensus was that
Rule 68's primary effect would be to give defendants litigating under
many civil rights statutes leverage that they would not have under
other statutes. 137
Despite Rule 68's potential to reduce attorneys' fees and induce
settlements, in reality, it does not appear to be a major factor in the
practices of the civil rights lawyers I interviewed, whether they repre-
sent plaintiffs or defendants. Many plaintiffs' attorneys were surprised
that they had not received more Rule 68 offers and could count the
number of times they had on one hand.138 Defense attorneys like
Rule 68 in theory, but most do not use it frequently in practice.
139
Despite the infrequency of Rule 68 offers in the practices of the
attorneys I interviewed, plaintiffs' attorneys emphasized that a serious
134. Richard M. Swope and Samuel J. Webster, The Defense Goes on the Offense: Use
of Rule 68 in Civil Rights Litigation, 55 DEF. COUNS. J. 153, 154 (1988).
135. Gale C. Shumaker, Case Note, Marek v. Chesny: Civil Rights Attorney's Fees and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68: The Conflict Resolved, 12 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 287,299-
300 (1985).
136. Marek, 473 U.S. at 31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Jay H. Krulewitch, Note, Anatomy
of a Double Whammy: The Application of Rule 68 Offers and Fee Waivers of Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees under Section 1988, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 103, 114-15 (1987-88) (a conse-
quence of the Marek decision is that plaintiffs will make uninformed decisions; this will
deter private parties from bringing meritorious claims).
137. Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 123-
24 (1986) (Rule 68 "redistributes wealth" from the plaintiff to the defendant. The rule
allows the defendant to decrease both the plaintiffs gain from trial and the defendant's loss
at trial); Carol S. Schaefer, Marek v. Chesny: The Inherent Incompatibility of "Offers of
Judgment" and the Civil Rights Law, 2 Ono ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 153, 161-62 (Fall 1986)
(arguing that Marek enables defendants who may have violated the law to make a rule 68
offer and pressure a plaintiff to accept an unsatisfactory settlement to avoid the cost of
litigation before information can be obtained through discovery); Roy D. Simon, Jr., The
Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 40 (1985) (The threat of waiver would chill
zealous advocacy and meritorious litigation by forcing settlements on plaintiffs who could
not afford their attorneys fees.) Indeed, the basis of Justice Brennan's dissent in Marek
was his rejection of the possibility that Congress intended disparate settlement incentives
based "on minor variations in the phraseology of attorney's fees statutes." Marek, 473 U.S.
at 44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. Interviews 2-4, 6, 8, 11, 14, 19, 20, 26 & 29.
139. Interviews 30 & 32.
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Rule 68 offer provides a big incentive to settle.14o These offers are
most effective in cases that will be very expensive to take to trial or in
cases where liability may be fairly clear, but damage is uncertain.141
Several survey participants, however, emphasized that despite the
threat to fees posed by a serious Rule 68 offer, they would proceed to
trial if they viewed trial as the most appropriate course of action. 42
In the course of interviewing the survey participants, I asked why
Rule 68 was not a significant factor in their practices. The attorneys
offered a variety of explanations. First, it is often difficult for defense
counsel to evaluate a case, including plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, to de-
rive an offer that is serious enough to get the plaintiff's attorney's at-
tention. One defense attorney hesitates because he believes even if
plaintiffs receive an award that is less than the amount of a Rule 68
offer, their attorneys may inflate their fees so as to exceed the amount
of the offer, and the court would not detect the inflation if the amount
was not egregious. 43 Both plaintiff and defense attorneys responding
noted that at times it is difficult to get a defense client to give permis-
sion to make a realistic settlement offer at an early date, even if that
offer carries a strategic benefit. 44 Also, Rule 68 offers are public
records, so defendants concerned about the confidentiality of offers
may be reluctant to use them. 45 In addition, some defendants, partic-
ularly public entities, may believe that they have an excellent chance
of winning at trial even if the conduct of their employees was wrong.
For example, in the context of prisoner litigation, a defense attorney
for the State of California noted strong public opinion against pris-
oner lawsuits. 46
140. Interviews 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 21 & 25.
141. Interview 12; see Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981) ("Rule
68 provides an additional inducement to settle in those cases in which there is a strong
probability the plaintiff will obtain a judgment but the amount of recovery is uncertain.")
142. Interviews 12 & 25.
143. Interview 32.
144. Interviews 13, 17, 30 & 32.
145. The formal requirements of Rule 68 are that the offer and notice of acceptance,
together with proof of service, must be filed, at which point the clerk must enter judgment.
Ashley v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 794 F.2d 128, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1986); Mallory v. Eyrich, 922
F.2d 1273, 1279 (6th Cir. 1991).
146. Interview 31. See also Kim Mueller, Comment, Inmates' Civil Rights Cases and
the Federal Courts: Insights Derived From A Field Research Project In The Eastern District
of California, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1255, 1257 n.5 (1995) (recounting the results of a
California statewide survey in which only 21% of a representative sample of registered
voters felt inmates' rights to file civil rights suits should be preserved, and 63% said these
rights should be abolished. In response to a question about specific kinds of suits, 35%
thought inmates should be allowed to file lawsuits alleging constitutional violations based
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There is some evidence that City Attorneys' offices have awak-
ened to the possibilities inherent in Rule 68 offers in handling police
misconduct cases,147 and that when civil rights plaintiffs receive these
offers, they are forced to evaluate their cases in a very conservative
fashion. One police misconduct attorney stressed that because her
cases are not popular with juries, they are extremely risky despite
their legal merit.148 She noted that Rule 68 "separates the wheat from
the chaff" in terms of ability to evaluate a case.149
My conclusion as to the effect of Marek is that, while the decision
gives a further edge to defense attorneys in the settlement process and
is valuable in a narrow range of cases, the "tool" the Supreme Court
provided is, by and large, not as useful as might have been anticipated.
C. Unavailability of Contingency Risk Multipliers
In City of Burlington v. Dague,150 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that contingency risk enhancers (also known as multipli-
ers)' 5' are rarely to be permitted under most federal statutes with fee-
shifting provisions. 152 Prior to Dague, some circuit courts had permit-
ted prevailing plaintiffs to receive a multiplier in addition to attorneys'
fees awards calculated on a lodestar, or hourly, rate, to reflect the risk
associated with certain types of litigation. 53 Before Dague, the
Supreme Court had recognized that "in some cases of exceptional suc-
on inadequate medical care, and 33% thought suits alleging excessive force by prison per-
sonnel should be actionable. The others either felt otherwise or did not respond.)
147. Interviews 25 & 30.
148. Interview 25.
149. Id.
150. 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
151. An enhancement is an upward adjustment of the "lodestar" figure. Under fee-
shifting provisions, attorneys are entitled to a "reasonable" fee. The Supreme Court has
decided that the most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee
is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by the lawyer's
hourly rate. This figure is referred to as the "lodestar." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 433 (1983); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984).
152. The Court states that the rule it creates applies uniformly to all fee award statutes
that contain language like the statutes at issue in the case. Dague, 505 U.S. at 562. In
Dague, the statutes at issue were the State Solid Waste Disposal Act and the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. Other statutes with similar language include 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k). See Charles Silver, Incoherence and Irrationality in the
Law of Attorneys' Fees, 12 REv. OF LrrxG. 301, 305-06 (1993).
153. The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits permitted multipliers, while the
D.C. Circuit barred them completely. Other circuits, such as the Third, Fifth, Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh, permitted multipliers only in exceptional cases. Jack Vining Dell Jr.,
Case Note, The Demise of Fee-Shifting Statutes: Will Congress Respond? 44 MERCER L.
REv. 1375, 1376 n.12 (1993).
January 1997]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
cess, an enhanced award may be justified."' 54 In Dague, the Court
limited judicial discretion to enhance fees based on the contingent risk
involved in litigation. This rejection of contingency risk multipliers
was based on two primary rationales. First, the Court stated that the
lodestar is strongly presumed to be a reasonable fee.' 55 Attorneys are
already compensated for contingency because the hours spent or the
hourly rate charged reflect the complexity of the issues in the case.156
Therefore, according to the Court, a contingency risk multiplier would
constitute a windfall for the plaintiff in the form of overcompensation
of the plaintiff's attorney. :57 The Court stressed that the lodestar
model, and not a contingent fee model, should govern fee decisions in
civil rights cases.' 58 Second, the Court feared that if contingency risk
multipliers were available, attorneys would be given an incentive to
take questionable cases because they would be highly compensated in
the event they won.' 59 The Court was not persuaded that the contin-
gency risk multiplier was necessary to attract competent counsel.' 60
Instead, the Court reasoned that competent counsel would flock to
the meritorious cases; the primary reason attorneys choose not to take
some cases is that they are too risky from a legal standpoint. 61
Commentators assailed the Court's opinion as being analytically
contradictory to past cases. Whereas in JeffD. and Marek, the Court's
opinion was at least consistent with statutory language, if not policy,
the court in Dague propounded a general rule with no statutory au-
thority whatsoever. 62 Some commentators have predicted that cer-
tain types of civil rights litigation will become impossible without
154. Blum, 465 U.S. at 887; see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. As one treatise writer
notes, the Supreme Court did not overrule that language in Dague, and since that decision,
the lower courts have in some instances made positive and negative adjustments to the
lodestar. PEARL, supra note 33, at § 13.3.
155. 505 U.S. at 562.
156. Id. at 562-63.
157. Id. at 563.
158. Id. at 562. Justice Scalia believed that if contingent risk multipliers were awarded,
a contingent fee model would in essence be grafted onto the lodestar model, forming a
hybrid model. By allowing risk "pooling" under a contingent model, the Court would be
permitting attorneys to be compensated for cases in which they had not prevailed. This
would conflict with the basic premise of the lodestar model. Id at 566.
159. Id. at 563.
160. Id at 563-64.
161. d. at 564.
162. Silver, supra note 152, at 329-30 (Professor Silver argues that the Court's reason-
ing is in direct contradiction to Justice Scalia's own jurisprudential views about how judges
should construe vague statutes. Silver contends that, following Scalia's own views, the
Court should have avoided making a general rule from an admittedly vague statute, and
left enhancements to the discretion of the district courts).
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contingency risk multipliers because parties will not be able to com-
pete with non-civil rights litigants for legal representation. 163 Their
argument is that given the risk involved in some types of civil rights
cases and the inability to be compensated for it through an enhance-
ment, attorneys will take only cases where they are assured of com-
pensation. Commentators are quick to point out that the factors that
make certain kinds of civil rights cases difficult do not necessarily re-
late to the substantive difficulty of the case, but rather may center on
the lack of jury sympathy for the plaintiff or the unpopularity of par-
ticular claims. 164 Given the perceived importance of contingency risk
multipliers to at least some attorneys litigating federal civil rights ac-
tions, I asked the practitioners I interviewed whether they thought the
decision would have an effect on civil rights litigation generally and in
their practice in particular.
Survey participants differed in their assessments of the impact of
Dague. As I explain, their responses seem to correspond to the type
of civil rights litigation they practice. From the defense perspective,
the attorneys I interviewed made several observations concerning the
Court's condemnation of multipliers in Dague.165 When plaintiffs had
the ability to seek a multiplier, they had greater leverage to seek a
higher settlement, and the potential costs of non-settlement were
more uncertain. Even though in most cases multipliers were unlikely
to be awarded, the possibility could not be discounted for settlement
purposes. One defense attorney emphasized that multipliers could
raise the hourly rates of attorneys from $300 or $350 per hour,1 66 using
163. See, eg., Silver, supra note 152, at 332-33 (Given a choice between an unenhanced
hourly rate in a fee award case and an equal rate in a case where payment is certain, a
lawyer will have strong incentives to decline the fee award case); Kyle R. Kravitz, Note,
Denying the Devil His Due: Contingency Fee Multipliers After City of Burlington v. Dague,
38 ViLL. L. REv. 1661, 1679-85 (speculating that the riskiness of statutory fee cases will
cause attorneys to shun them); but see James D. Cole, Comment, Nonpayment Risk Multi-
pliers: Incentives or Windfalls?, 53 U. Cin. L. REv. 1074, 1106 (1986) (pre-Dague argument
that elimination of risk incentives will lead to a uniform and predictable incentive
structure).
164. Silver, supra note 152, at 319-20.
165. Contingency risk multipliers remain available under the law of some states. See,
e.g., CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 1996). The Ninth Circuit has also contin-
ued to award multipliers in common fund cases. See, e.g., In re Washington Pub. Power
Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1301 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court's decision in Dague
also suggests multipliers may be available under § 1988 and analogous federal statutes
under very limited cases. Dague, 505 U.S. at 562; see also Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69,
78-79 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
166. Using prevailing market rates for an attorney with ample experience in a large
urban area. SMOLLA, supra note 33, at § 16.01[3][b]. Many of the attorneys receiving such
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a lodestar calculation, to as much as $600-$700 per hour.167 Another
defense attorney did not believe that the lack of a multiplier has de-
terred plaintiffs' attorneys from undertaking representation of clients
in civil rights cases.' 68 She described most plaintiffs' attorneys as indi-
viduals who are committed to civil rights litigation-people who
would not be deterred by lack of enhancements.169
Plaintiffs' attorneys were much more diverse than defense attor-
neys in their analyses of the effect of the Court's decision in Dague.
Some attorneys did not perceive the loss of a multiplier as significant
and noted that they are much more concerned with getting paid for all
their hours.170 This view was expressed by attorneys doing police mis-
conduct litigation and employment litigation, and by one legal services
attorney.' 71 Indeed, one attorney concurred precisely with sentiments
expressed by the defense attorneys and stated outright that multipliers
are an abuse of the system.172 Several others stated that under the
lodestar formulation, they are paid at a high hourly rate, and that
courts have adjusted for the lack of a multiplier by awarding them a
greater percentage of the hours billed.173 Thus, although these attor-
neys noted that Dague had lowered the stakes in settlement, they felt
the impact of the decision was not too great, particularly because mul-
tipliers were not awarded in many cases anyway.
Other plaintiffs' attorneys believe that the absence of multipliers
in most federal civil rights cases has had a chilling effect on the prac-
tice of civil rights law.' 74 The negative effects described vary. One
police misconduct attorney stated that the lodestar would not yield a
reasonable fee, especially if the hours billed are disputed. 75 He said
that by the time courts exclude claims that do not prevail and time
billed on defendants who are dismissed, it is difficult to receive a stat-
utory fee award high enough to make police misconduct cases worth
litigating. 76 Another attorney, addressing the ramifications of the de-
cision in the settlement context, stated that without the potential for
rates would never in fact be able to bill their clients at the rate utilized by the court but




170. Interviews 3, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 22.
171. Interviews 11, 13 & 14.
172. Interview 3.
173. Interview 3, 5 & 25.
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multipliers, plaintiffs' attorneys lack the leverage to obtain settlements
that provide reasonable fees.177
Some plaintiffs' attorneys believe the Court's decision in Dague
will influence the specific types of cases they undertake. A police mis-
conduct attorney stated that the effect of the decision has been to
make cases against cities and counties based on violations of policy or
custom unprofitable. 178 These cases, which are expensive to try and
difficult to win, would have been candidates for multipliers before
Dague. This attorney expressed reluctance about bringing those types
of cases after Dague.179 Another attorney believes that Dague will
deter "cutting edge" cases and, thus, slow development of the law. 80
He suggested that the Supreme Court does not realize the difference
between frivolous and risky litigation, and he believes that attorneys
will be much more careful not to risk litigating undeveloped issues.' 8'
In the area of civil rights class actions, attorneys for plaintiffs de-
scribed Dague as the major factor limiting their practice.182 Because
class action cases are so expensive to litigate, the possibility of multi-
pliers was a huge incentive to undertake representation. 8 3 Where ex-
pert witness fees are recoverable, the need for multipliers is
admittedly reduced. 84 In cases that are expert-intensive and in which
expert witness fees are not recoverable, however, the lack of a multi-
plier can be devastating. The primary example, cited by numerous
attorneys, is voting rights litigation. 85 There, even ascertaining the





182. Interviews 6, 16 & 19.
183. Class action cases are extremely expensive to litigate because of their administra-
tive complexity. Thus, the risk of losing a case is a significant deterrent to taking one.
Class action lawyers explained that multipliers provided the "carrot" of a large pay-off that
could offset the risk of an enormous loss. One class action lawyer noted that use of a
percentage of a common fund as a basis for awarding attorneys' fees is one way around the
lack of multipliers. Interview 29. Attorneys ask the court to award a percentage of the
common fund in fees. The Ninth Circuit has approved fee awards in the 25% range in
common fund cases. In re Pacific Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373 (9th Cir. 1995). However,
the strategy of seeking a percentage of the common fund only works to offset the risk of
loss in cases where relief is primarily monetary and the award is likely to be large. There-
fore, in cases that are expensive and risky to litigate, and in which injunctive relief is the
primary remedy sought, the lack of multipliers cannot be offset.
184. Interview 1. Expert witness fees may be reimbursed to prevailing parties in Title
VII cases, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12205 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996).
185. Interviews 6, 7, 17, 19 & 20.
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viability of a claim prior to filing suit can cost between fifteen and
twenty-five thousand dollars in expert fees.18 6 Without multipliers,
even full compensation at lodestar rates cannot possibly cover the
costs of litigation. The attorney mentioned earlier, whose practice fo-
cuses exclusively on voting rights, expressed doubts that his practice
will survive Dague.18 7 Indeed, this attorney recently opened a color
printing business to try to subsidize his law practice. He stated that
the other private practitioners who used to litigate voting rights cases
will not take them now and predicted that no new lawyers will enter
the market in California. 188
In addition to the voting rights area, other attorneys involved in
large-scale impact litigation feel the impact of Dague profoundly. At-
torneys in non-profit organizations, such as those litigating disability
issues or prison conditions cases, indicated that although they feel the
effects of Dague, they will survive it. Most of these organizations have
funding that supplements and indeed surpasses fee awards, as well as
attorneys and staff members who are willing to take low salaries be-
cause of their commitment to their work. 8 9 However, the lawyers for
these non-profit organizations caution that private firms attracted to
civil rights practice because of the potential to receive multipliers will
no longer be willing to participate. 90 In exchange for the possibility
of a multiplier, these private firms have been willing to undertake the
enormous costs involved in the litigation and assume the risk of loss.
The lack of multipliers removes the incentive, and thus makes it much
harder to enlist the support of private firms. Some types of litigation
are far too expensive to undertake on a pro bono basis, and private
firms will be unwilling to take the risk of loss absent multipliers. 19'
My conclusion with respect to the rule eliminating court discre-
tion to enhance attorneys' fees is that it will affect some types of civil
rights practice-notably the high-cost or high-stakes litigation where
recovery at a lodestar rate will not cover costs. When one looks at the
universe of civil rights claims, the actual number of cases affected will
probably be small, as there is a fairly uniform consensus that most
cases would never be candidates for fee enhancement. However, the




189. Interviews 5, 9 & 24.
190. Id.
191. Interviews 19, 24 & 26.
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described above and may significantly affect the economic viability of
bringing these types of actions.
D. Damages Rules and Their Relation to Fees
Many types of civil rights actions seek damages from the defend-
ant. In the area of constitutional litigation, the Supreme Court held in
Carey v. Piphus that compensatory damages are to be awarded for
constitutional violations only on proof of actual injury.192 Juries may
not assume damage or award damages simply to vindicate a right. In
employment discrimination cases governed by Title VII, statutory lim-
itations on remedies had the effect of limiting the relief a plaintiff
could recover.193 Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the damages
available under Title VII have been expanded in cases of intentional
discrimination. 94 Nonetheless, damages are primarily compensatory
and subject to caps based on the number of persons employed. Thus,
in both constitutional litigation and in cases brought under Title VII, a
compensatory model is the basis for damage awards.
In theory, constraints on damages should not deter plaintiffs' at-
torneys from agreeing to represent plaintiffs with low damages. The
availability of statutory attorneys' fees should serve to reassure coun-
sel that they will be compensated even if the plaintiff recovers little.
192. Carey, 435 U.S. at 264.
193. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs in employment discrimination ac-
tions could receive monetary relief only in the form of back pay. See supra note 54.
194. When Title VII remedies were limited to backpay and injunctive relief, the prob-
lem was even more profound. The 1991 Civil Rights Act expanded the damages available
in Title VII actions somewhat. In certain cases based on intentional discrimination, com-
pensatory and punitive damages are available.
Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 created 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), which pro-
vides, in relevant part:
Damages in cases of intentional discrimination in employment. (a) Right of re-
covery.-
(1) Civil rights-In an action brought by a complaining party under section
706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5) against a re-
spondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an em-
ployment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited
under sections 703,704, or 717 of the Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 or 2000e-3), and
provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1977 of the
Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981), the complaining party may recover com-
pensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b), in addition to
any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from
the respondent .... 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
Section (b) imposes damages caps. For example, an employer who has more than fourteen
and fewer than 101 employees in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year will not incur compensatory and punitive damages in excess of
$50,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3)(A).
The Supreme Court confirmed that attorneys' fees need not be pro-
portional to the plaintiff's damages in City of Riverside v. Rivera.195 In
Rivera, a plurality of the Supreme Court upheld an award of $245,456
in attorneys' fees in a case where the jury awarded only $33,350.196
The decision was crucial to civil rights litigators because monetary
awards in civil rights claims are often lower than claims in tort actions
due to the lack of large compensatory damages. 197
In the context of constitutional litigation, it can be difficult to ob-
tain compensatory damages for what many jurors view as dignitary
injuries.198 The facts of Rivera itself illustrate the point. The damages
awarded there were divided among eight plaintiffs, all law-abiding citi-
zens who had hosted or attended a party broken up by a large number
of police officers using tear gas and acting without a warrant. Four of
the plaintiffs were arrested but no charges were brought. Plaintiffs'
attorneys proved the police response was not inconsistent with general
hostility to the Chicano community in Riverside. 199 The district judge
concluded that the low verdict reflected both the reluctance of jurors
to award damages against police officers and the restraint with which
the plaintiffs described their injuries.2 00 Injuries like those sustained
by the Rivera plaintiffs may appear less serious to jurors because they
do not involve personal injury or at least not injury of the magnitude
that makes for lucrative personal injury claims.
In the area of employment litigation, the problem of low damages
is admittedly less of an issue due to the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. However, employment practitioners interviewed unequivo-
cally asserted that the amount of damages is a primary consideration
in deciding whether to take a case.20 It is entirely possible that a low
or middle income individual could suffer job discrimination that
would create some economic loss and constitute a significant career
barrier yet not present enormous emotional distress damage or war-
195. 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986).
196. Id. at 581.
197. See Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section
1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 465 (1978) ("Ex-
cept in the rare case in which a successful plaintiff recovers a substantial award for serious
injuries inflicted by excessive force, cases of illegal arrests and searches, even when suc-
cessful, generally result in very modest awards.").
198. See Nathaniel S. Colley, Civil Actions For Damages Arising Out of Violations of
Civil Rights, 17 HASTINGs L.J. 189, 203-04 (1965) (jury operates in vacuum because it does
not share plaintiff's experiences); see infra text accompanying notes 280-281.
199. Rivera, 477 U.S. at 572.
200. Id. at 571.
201. Interviews 1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20 & 26.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS PRACTICE IN THE 1990'S
rant punitives.2 o= As I explain below, plaintiffs with low value cases
may have difficulty obtaining an attorney due to the relationship be-
tween fees and damages in the settlement context.
Even in cases where the plaintiff prevails at trial, low damages
can bear some relationship to an award of statutory fees. In Farrar v.
Hobby,20 3 the Supreme Court held that in some circumstances a plain-
tiff who formally "prevails" under 42 U.S.C. section 1988 but receives
only nominal damages should receive no attorneys' fees at all. The
Court believed that, in a case like Farrar, where equitable relief was
not at issue, the plaintiff's success had to be measured in monetary
terms. The jury's failure to award more than nominal damages thus
suggested that the plaintiff was not successful, despite the nominal vic-
tory. Although the facts of Farrar were somewhat unique,2°4 the deci-
sion suggests that perhaps the Court is retreating from the non-
proportionality rule of Rivera.205 Indeed, two conflicting Ninth Cir-
cuit decisions20 6 suggest that the Farrar decision may have the effect of
202. As Professor Selmi has noted, it is relevant to consider what dollar amount consti-
tutes a low value case in the employment context. His review of EEOC non-class trial
recoveries indicates that median awards were under $10,000. Selmi, supra note 60, at 20.
Selmi characterizes these as low value cases. Id. at 32. One of the employment attorneys
interviewed characterized a low value case as one under $100,000. Interview 2. Another
expressed the view that cases with damages under $30,000 would be difficult to place with
an attorney. Interview 13. Clearly there are differences in opinion about what level of
damages must be presented to make a case worth taking.
Professor Selmi concurs that when discrimination forms the underlying basis for the
claim, there is a great need to ensure an available judicial forum even for small cases.
Selmi, supra note 60, at 33. After weighing a variety of considerations, he concludes that,
particularly in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, low lost wages alone should not be a
disincentive to undertake representation. Such cases might be coupled with punitive dam-
ages, for example, that would make them attractive to lawyers. Id. at 37.
203. 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
204. In Farrar, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking 17 million dollars from six defend-
ants. After ten years of litigation, including two appeals, he received one dollar from one
defendant. The Court found that the suit would benefit no one besides the plaintiff. Far-
rar, 506 U.S. at 106-07.
205. John E. Kirklin, Recovery of Attorney's Fees in Section 1983 Cases, in SECrION
1983 LmGATION AND ATroRmYs' FEEs 663-64 (1995) ("Although the Court did not sug-
gest an overruling of Rivera, the implication is clear that in the district court's discretion
the otherwise reasonable fee award ... in a case in which only nominal damages were
awarded may be reduced to zero or to a low fee award"); David Shub, Note, Private Attor-
neys General, Prevailing Parties and Public Benefit: Attorney's Fees Awards for Civil Rights
Plaintiffs, 42 DuKE LJ. 706, 721-22 (1992) (arguing that cases like Farrar ignored the pri-
vate attorney general intent of Congress, as enunciated in Rivera).
206. Compare WIlcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550,556 (9th Cir. 1994) (a lawsuit spark-
ing a change in policy will, in combination with a judgment for nominal damages, support
an award of fees) with Romberg v. Nichols, 48 F.3d 453,455 (9th Cir. 1995) (no fees where
only nominal damages and no tangible results).
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making civil rights cases that have low damages much more financially
risky for attorneys. In light of the damages rules themselves and the
emerging glimmer of doubt regarding the non-proportionality rule in
Rivera, I asked participants if a plaintiff's low damages would deter
them from taking an otherwise meritorious case, and if they thought
the decision would have any effect on the practice of civil rights law or
in their practice in particular.
The responses of participants in this study indicate that the dam-
ages rules profoundly limit the willingness of attorneys to take cases
with low damages.2 07 This is so despite the non-proportionality rule in
Rivera. Attorneys not only mentioned their reluctance to handle
cases regarding employment, police misconduct, and prisoner litiga-
tion, but also expressed such reluctance in connection with First
Amendment and other constitutional litigation and cases brought
under Title VII.2 08 The reason for the apparent disparity between the-
ory (plaintiff's damages should not affect fees) and reality (they do) is
that many cases will settle, and despite the Supreme Court decisions,
the amount of money allocated for the attorneys' fee award is, in fact,
somewhat proportional to the damages in issue. Thus, while defense
lawyers add fees to a settlement offer, they figure them as part of a
lump sum package, and the lower the compensatory damages in issue,
the lower the fee award. While plaintiffs' attorneys, of course, retain
and sometimes exercise the prerogative of counseling a client not to
accept a settlement offer because any award for fees would be ex-
tremely low, ethical constraints, pessimism about the prospects of full
payment if fees are awarded by a court, the prospect of lengthy delays
in payment, and the risk of not prevailing at all, often lead the attor-
ney to concur that settlement is a better option.
Again, from a theoretical perspective, the fact that these trade-
offs are made is not unique to civil rights litigation. Settlements nec-
essarily involve compromise-a goal specifically embraced by the
Supreme Court in cases like Jeff D. In actuality, the damages rules,
combined with the propriety of partial fee waivers, produce a result in
some cases that seems contrary to what the Supreme Court intended.
Lawyers in a variety of practices unequivocally assert that some types
207. Professor Selmi observes that given the changes in employment discrimination
remedies under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it is more difficult to assess the value of an
employment case. Damages will depend not only on lost wages, but also on size of the
employer and the nature of the defendant's act. Selmi, supra note 60, at 37.
208. Interviews 1, 4, 5, 10, 12, 13, 16, 18-20, 25 & 26. Attorneys for whom the issue is
unimportant are discussed infra at notes 215-221.
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of civil rights cases are not economically feasible and that they will not
take them unless they are interested in pro bono work. For example,
in the area of employment discrimination, a number of lawyers stated
that cases of low wage earners (typically blue collar workers) are not
considered economically feasible unless there is excellent proof of
emotional distress or a potential for punitive damages.209 Sexual har-
assment of a low wage earner might present a promising claim,210 but
denial of a promotion or termination would not.21' The claim that low
damages make it very difficult to represent potential plaintiffs was as-
serted in differing contexts as well: prisoner litigation,21 2 police mis-
conduct litigation,213 and other types of constitutional litigation.214
A number of the attorneys I interviewed indicated that they do
represent plaintiffs with low damages.215 Non-profit organizations liti-
gating for impact clearly take such cases.216 For them, the significance
of rules limiting damages to actual injury is that cases are difficult to
refer to the private bar. Class action attorneys also are able to repre-
sent people in the working class who have low individual damages
claims. However, there are not many firms doing class action work.217
Barring these options, blue collar workers terminated from employ-
ment or people who have suffered police brutality but emerged with
soft tissue injuries must find private lawyers who are willing to take
their cases despite the low potential recovery. Some lawyers will un-
dertake this work, although I did not encounter many.
The lawyers I met who are willing to represent low wage earners
or other plaintiffs with low damages in a non-class action context ap-
209. Interviews 2, 4, 10, 12, 13, 16, 19 & 20.
210. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993),
damages are available in sexual harassment hostile work environment cases without proof
of psychological injury. This component of intangible damages makes the cases worth
more money, and hence, more appealing to attorneys, particularly when the plaintiff has
suffered significant emotional distress as a result of the harassment.
211. Professor Selmi concludes that lost-wage cases are precisely the kind of cases that
ought to be treated as a low priority. Selmi, supra note 60, at 37. In any event, he con-
cludes that attorneys could handle such cases if they desire by increasing the volume of the
smaller cases to compensate for the lower likely fees. Id The responses of participants in
the study indicate that many are reluctant to accept the low-damages cases. Interviews 10
& 25. See also supra note 208. One attorney who takes them believes that although the
damages are low, the discrimination suffered may constitute an enormous roadblock in the
career of a low or moderate wage earner. Interview 13.
212. Interview 5.
213. Interviews 15, 18, 26 & 30.
214. Interview 25.
215. Interviews 2, 5 & 8.
216. Interviews 9, 11 & 12.
217. Interviews 1, 6, 19 & 20.
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peared to operate very close to the margin of economic survival. One
lawyer willing to take low damages, police misconduct cases operates
a completely nontraditional practice. To keep overhead low, she
works out of her home and conducts no discovery.218 An employment
lawyer who has specifically chosen to represent low wage earners and
poor people is barely able to make ends meet and was exploring other
practice options when I met her.219 Individuals willing to practice law
in these circumstances are rare. More commonly, attorneys take a
small number of low damage cases on principle or diversify their
workload so that they can subsidize the cases that they know will not
make money.220 Despite the existence of individual attorneys whose
choice of cases is driven more by ideological commitment than money,
the plaintiffs' damages were a factor many survey participants viewed
as extremely important in determining what cases they wanted to
accept.22'
The Supreme Court's decision in Farrar v. Hobby may further
decrease the settlement leverage of plaintiffs and increase the reluc-
tance of plaintiffs' attorneys to litigate low damages cases. Attorneys
representing both plaintiffs and defendants agreed that although Far-
rar is very limited factually, it is a significant decision that may provide
an opening for the Supreme Court to reevaluate the holding in Rivera
that fees need not be proportionate to recovery.22
If Rivera is undermined, attorneys will be even less likely to take
cases in which the injuries suffered are not severe and in which dam-
ages awarded are not high. As one city attorney defending section
1983 police misconduct cases noted, even in the event of a death, dam-
ages may be low because the plaintiffs may have no earning history or
other factors to substantiate an award under current damages rules.
Attorneys' fees often comprise the largest part of such claims3 If
these fees can be reduced, or made proportionate to recovery, civil
rights attorneys will have little incentive to bring the cases. Defense
attorneys who now settle such cases because the attorneys' fees com-
ponent is a wild card may instead opt to try them and hope for the
best.224
218. Interview 8. One might well question whether this policy is consistent with her
professional obligations as a lawyer.
219. Interview 13.
220. Interviews 2 & 5.
221. Interviews 1, 2, 10, 12, 16, 19, 20, 25 & 26.
222. Interviews 2, 8, 14-16, 17, 20, 22, 25 & 32.
223. Interview 30.
224. Interview 32.
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Several attorneys commented that they must make difficult stra-
tegic decisions about what claims to pursue given the combination of
juror reluctance to award high damages for constitutional violations
and the possibility that judges will use Farrar to justify a denial of
fees.322 One attorney picks only cases that are viable as state tort ac-
tions.226 He finds jurors much more willing to make awards on the
basis of the state claims than federal claims. He reasons that even if a
court interprets Farrar to find that he did not have sufficient success
on the federal claims to merit statutory fees, he will be protected by
his contingency fee agreement. This strategy, however, excludes from
his practice claims that are substantively meritorious but not rich in
tort-like damages.
IV. Demand for Representation and Ability of Civil Rights
Attorneys to Respond
The prior section's focus on understanding the impact of
Supreme Court decisions dealing with fees and damages is one avenue
to help explain how and why certain cases are taken and others are
rejected. Many other factors, however, contribute to attorney deci-
sions about whether to represent a potential client. In this section, I
discuss the participants' perception of demand for representation and
some of the barriers to representation the participants identified in
explaining their responses.227
Many plaintiffs' attorneys responding to my questions regarding
the demand for representation agreed that a huge number of individu-
als seek representation.228 Some noted that many of those seeking
consultations have weak cases.229 Two respondents mentioned that
they knew of attorneys who would take any case presented to them.2 30
They were uniformly critical of these individuals, describing them as
doing a disservice to the enforcement of civil rights law.231 Several
225. Interviews 8, 16 & 25.
226. Interview 3.
227. Participants were asked about the number of calls they receive from potential
clients, the number of inquiries that ultimately develop into cases the attorney will take,
and whether they can successfully refer promising cases to other attorneys in the event that
this is necessary. There may be some intrinsic bias in favor of asserting that one's services
are in demand; I tried to minimize this possibility by asking for concrete facts about the
participants' practices.
228. Interviews 1-4, 6, 8-10, 12, 14, 15, 17-19 & 25.
229. Interviews 3, 4, 13 & 25.
230. Interviews 4 & 25.
231. 11
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attorneys concurred that if a client has a strong case, resources to pay
a retainer and costs, and high damages, an attorney can be found, and,
indeed, there may even be competition among attorneys to obtain
such cases.232 The core question relating to demand, then, is whether
individuals with plausible cases obtain at least consultation with a
competent attorney, and whether attorneys are able to undertake rep-
resentation in cases that seem capable of success on the merits. Over-
all, the consensus was that even persons with cases that seem viable or
better may not obtain representation.2 33 The explanations for this an-
swer diverged, reflecting the differences among the different practice
areas of the attorneys interviewed. It will thus be helpful to evaluate
practice areas separately.
In the civil rights class action context, for example, there is higher
demand than supply of attorneys because the attorneys can only af-
ford to litigate cases that are virtually guaranteed to win. The costs of
litigating class actions are so enormous that few firms can afford to
handle the litigation at all, and each firm can only litigate a few cases
simultaneously. Therefore, the firms practicing in this area pick and
choose carefully. One attorney stated, "we take the winners of the
winners." 234 The class action attorneys interviewed perceive the mar-
ket as dramatically underserved. 235
232. Interview 3 (People with great cases will obtain an attorneys-those with merely
decent cases and a lack of resources may have difficulty) & Interview 16 (at least ten attor-
neys competing for the type of cases he takes).
233. Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17-19, 22 & 25. The Eisenberg/Schwab
study tends to suggest this same conclusion with respect to constitutional tort litigation.
Based on data showing low success rates and "surprisingly low" numbers of "true constitu-
tional tort cases," Eisenberg and Schwab suggest the data may be evidence of increased
official compliance with constitutional norms, or evidence of a marginally effective system
in which many valid claims go unremedied. They reach no dispositive conclusion in their
1988 article. Eisenberg & Schwab, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation, supra note 21,
at 781.
234. Interview 6.
235. Interviews 1, 6 & 19. Statistics bear out this perception. Reports compiled by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts show a precipitous decline in new Rule 23 class
action filings. For example, in 1976, 1,174 job discrimination class actions were filed. In
1994, there were 56 job discrimination class actions. Annual Report of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 239 (1976) and X-5 (1994). Following
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the number of discrimination class actions has
slowly climbed. In 1996, there were 68 discrimination suits. Allen R. Myerson, As U.S.
Bias Cases Drop, Employees Take Up Fight, Ti NEw YoRK TIMES, Jan. 12, 1997, at 1.
Commentators differ in their explanations of why class actions have declined. See,
e.g., Bryant Garth, et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney Genera" Perspectives from
an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 353 (1988). These schol-
ars conducted an empirical study of plaintiffs' class action lawyers to understand how the
private attorney general concept has changed over time. Although the array of factors
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In the individual employment context, the attorneys interviewed
perceive a great deal of demand, but note that factors such as low
damages or high costs may make representation infeasible in some
instances.236 In addition, a client's own lack of resources may pre-
clude that client from obtaining an attorney despite the possibility of a
fee award. Several attorneys stated that they require clients to make
monthly payments toward a retainer and costs. If they cannot, poten-
tial clients will not get representation from those attorneys even if
they have a decent case.23
7
One employment lawyer stressed that although large numbers of
clients contact her office regarding representation, some lack the abil-
ity to sell their cases. She recounted instances in which potential cli-
ents were simply not articulate enough to provide the details that
shape an attorney's perception of the case; some of these cases may be
affecting the present role of class action attorneys is quite complex, the authors contend
that initially the private attorney general had the appearance of neutrality, a lawyer con-
tributing to a shared vision of progress. IL at 359. By 1980, any neutral justification had
lost its consensus, and government subsidies to public interest litigation became character-
ized as use of tax money for partisan advocacy. Id at 360. Garth et al. view modern class
action litigation as keenly grounded in economic incentives, both for the litigants and the
attorneys. Id at 366. They attribute much of the decrease in the volume of class action
litigation to shrinking federal funding for the Legal Services Corporation and the retreat of
private foundations, concluding that "the economic incentives provided by attorney fees do
not serve as a substitute motive to bring the class actions previously brought by govern-
ment subsidized lawyers." Id at 371. See also John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman,
The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983
(1991), in which the authors documented the virtual disappearance of the class action for
employment discrimination. Id. at 1019. Donohue and Siegelman believe that changes in
legal rules explain a great proportion of this decline. See, e.g., East Tex. Motor Freight
Sys., Inc., v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (employment discrimination is not assumed to
be class discrimination; requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 must be met); General Tel. Co.
of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) (proof of individual discrimination not ade-
quate to certify a class action). Donohue and Siegelman also believe developments outside
of employment litigation, such as changes in rules governing attorneys' fees, and notifica-
tion requirements, may have contributed to the decline. Donohue & Siegelman, supra
note 235, at 1021.
The increase in potential damages made available by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, in
addition to other factors such as availability of jury trials, have given attorneys renewed
incentive to bring employment discrimination claims, although the number of cases filed is
far short of where it was in 1976. Myerson, supra note 235, at 10. Employment discrimina-
tion class actions still require firms with the financial resources to litigate the cases.
236. Interviews 2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 20 & 26.
237. The advantage of this procedure, according to one attorney, is that the client has a




legitimate if enough time is spent investigating them, but they may
also fall through the cracks.23
8
Several employment attorneys noted that they had little confi-
dence that they could refer potential clients to other competent attor-
neys who would take their cases.239 One lawyer who receives about
ten calls a week from potential clients said that colleagues view refer-
rals suspiciously. Even though he cannot possibly take all the cases
offered, other lawyers wonder whether there is something wrong with
the case if he does not want it. If he feels that the potential client
really deserves help, he has to undertake his own investigation of the
case just to be able to refer it to another attorney.240 Another attor-
ney doing sexual harassment and gender discrimination litigation re-
ceives 300 calls per month. She said that she has the feeling potential
clients bounce from firm to firm seeking representation. She charac-
terized the plaintiffs' bar as growing, but still small.241
In the area of police misconduct litigation, practitioners gauged
the demand for their services as high, much higher than they could
handle in their practices.242 However, even cases with plausible or
promising constitutional violations are often not desirable from the
standpoint of a practitioner. Unless the plaintiffs have suffered physi-
cal injuries, such cases often are not economically feasible.243 The
238. Interviews 3 & 25. This factor could also affect the ability of clients seeking repre-
sentation in other types of civil rights cases or other unrelated fields of law. The less so-
phisticated the client, the more danger there is that the client may not properly convey the
relevant information. In theory, cases brought under federal antidiscrimination statutes
that require the filing of a charge with an administrative agency, such as the EEOC, and
subsequent agency investigation, should require less investigative work at the intake stage
than other types of litigation, because the agency performs an investigative function. The
EEOC is so backlogged in its investigations, however, that it takes an average of one year,
and often two, to complete an investigation. Selmi, supra note 60, at 8. As Selmi discusses,
a plaintiff has a statutory right to request a "Notice of Right to Sue" letter after 180 days
from the filing of the complaint, and the EEOC must issue the notice, regardless of
whether it has completed its investigation. In cases in which such a letter is requested, the
EEOC's sole function is to issue the letter. Id.
239. Interviews 3, 12, 13 & 18.
240. Interview 2.
241. Interview 10.
242. Interviews 3 (police misconduct cases hard to place, more inquiries than attorney
can handle), 14 (more calls than can handle), 15 (receives calls every day from people who
at least deserve an assessment), 18 (10-20 calls per day) & 25 (awesome demand; phone
ringing off the hook).
243. Interview 25. Physical injuries that would constitute good tort claims are likely to
fare well under the damages rules applicable in constitutional tort actions; however, be-
cause damages (other than nominal sums) are only awarded to compensate for actual in-
jury, and not to vindicate rights, cases of less severe injury will not lead to high jury awards
or settlements that defray litigation costs. See supra text accompanying notes 192-226.
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cases are also complicated because in many instances, clients bringing
police misconduct cases have had past exposure to the criminal justice
system-a fact that makes their cases less appealing to jurors, and less
desirable for attorneys, regardless of the merits.244 In the police mis-
conduct area, the attorneys I interviewed were skeptical about their
ability to refer cases to other attorneys when they could not take
them. Several police misconduct attorneys recounted having to talk
their friends into taking the cases, and even then, the friends would
only do so if the referring attorney agreed to provide guidance.245
The prisoners' rights attorneys I spoke with recount enormous
demand for legal representation by the prison population and few re-
sources available to respond.246 Of course, many of the problems pris-
oners have do not relate to civil rights violations, and often they are
problems that are not capable of resolution in the legal system. Still,
the overwhelming majority of individual prisoner civil rights claims
are brought without legal representation.247 Pro se prisoners may re-
ceive self-help materials from non-profit law firms and possibly advice
from law students working through clinics or from other prisoners.
The attorneys included in the survey perceived much need for
their services and low availability of attorneys willing to assist. A legal
services attorney in Idaho said that under no circumstances could he
refer institutional litigation in the corrections area to members of the
private bar.248 The cases are expensive to litigate, difficult to win, and
politically unpopular. In California, some private firms have been
willing to undertake institutional litigation regarding prison condi-
244. Interview 14.
245. Interviews 15 & 18.
246. Interviews 5 & 24.
247. Interviews 5, 22 & 24. The EisenbergSchwab study suggests prisoner litigation is
both less successful and less burdensome in the sense of demanding judges' court time than
the average non-civil rights case. Eisenberg & Schwab, Explaining Constitutional Tort Liti-
gation, supra note 21, at 734. Schwab and Eisenberg attribute part of the inability of pris-
oners to obtain counsel to their general inability to pay lawyers. Id. at 770. The study also
found that when prisoners are represented by counsel, their cases become almost indistin-
guishable from non-prisoner constitutional tort claims, in terms of litigation activity and
likelihood of success. Id at 771. Based on their research, Schwab and Eisenberg do not
believe that market incentives such as attorneys' fees motivate lawyers to take meritorious
prisoner's cases and thus conclude many meritorious cases are unrepresented. Id at 774.
248. Interview 22.
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tions,249 although, as discussed below, their incentives to do so are
diminishing.250
A number of the attorneys who participated in the study indi-
cated that voting rights is an area of civil rights law that holds almost
no attraction to the private bar.251 For reasons described below, the
cases are simply too expensive and complicated to make them finan-
cially feasible. The blanket refusal to even consider a voting rights
case makes it difficult to use attorneys' experiences as any sort of mea-
sure of demand. The one private attorney doing voting rights work in
California indicated that he has no shortage of clients and offered his
opinion that there are many meritorious cases to be brought. How-
ever, his practice is so precarious from an economic standpoint that he
cannot afford to take on significant new work.252
249. A major class action challenge to conditions at a "state-of-the-art" prison, Pelican
Bay, was handled by the private law firm of Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati and the
non-profit San Quentin Prison Law Office. As prevailing parties, Wilson, Sonsini received
$4.25 million in fees, including $719,000 for the San Quentin Prison Law Office. Wilson,
Sonsini, et al. were awarded California's state pro bono award for representing the inmates
in the Pelican Bay litigation. Amy Stevens, The "Pro Bono" Payoff, Tm SAN FRANcIsco
EXAMnER., Dec. 3, 1995, at A12. The Pelican Bay litigation spawned much controversy
regarding the award of attorneys' fees. The defense attorney for the state dismissed any
characterization of the case as "pro bono" work, and, in fact, the state challenged Wilson,
Sonsini's billing records. The firm initially sought $7.6 million in fees, but eventually
agreed to the $4.25 million dollar figure to settle the fee dispute. Id. Wilson, Sonsini
partners explain the large award as a function of the state Department of Corrections'
defiant litigation position and the state's refusal to settle the case. Howard Mintz, State to
Pay $4.25 Million in Fees for Pelican Bay, THm RECORDER, Sept. 25, 1995, at 1.
250. Inability to seek a multiplier that would offset costs is one disincentive. See supra
text accompanying notes 150-191. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, supra note
29, will further remove incentives to private firm participation in large-scale civil rights
litigation by capping attorneys' fees at 150% of the rates paid to federal court-appointed
lawyers. The rates generally paid to court-appointed attorneys are $40/hour for time in-
curred other than in court and $60/hour for time spent in court. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(d)(1)(1988). In the Pelican Bay litigation, Wilson, Sonsini et al. billed at hourly
rates ranging from $265-$360 per hour for partners, and $135-$210 for associates. The non-
profit Prison Law Office billed at hourly rates for partners ranging from $280-$295 and
associates from $160-$200. Howard Mintz, Wilson, Sonsini Audit Reveals Heavy Staffing,
THE RECORDER, Sept. 26, 1995, at 1. Even if Wilson, Sonsini attorneys received 150% of
the court-appointed rate, they would have no incentive to join the Prison Law Office in a
major civil rights litigation project.
251. See, e.g., interviews 6, 7, 17, 19 & 20.
252. Interview 7. The fact that there is only one private attorney handling voting rights
cases in California speaks volumes about the viability of this practice area. He stated that
others used to do voting rights but can no longer afford to. He does not anticipate others
will enter the arena.
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Several practitioners identified disabilities law as a growth
area.5 3 An attorney with a major disability rights litigation firm, the
Disability Rights and Education Defense Fund (DREDF), attributed
this surge to the coming of age of a generation of disabled people who
have benefited from civil rights protection, such as the IDEA,5 4 dur-
ing their early years. These individuals are sensitized to discrimina-
tion and unwilling to accept it. DREDF has found that many
attorneys are willing to take referrals of discrimination cases;255 how-
ever, some attorneys still refuse work under the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act or other federal statutes because they lack experience
litigating such claims.256
V. Other Factors that Impact the Viability of Civil Rights
Practice
As one would anticipate, there are many factors in addition to the
fees potential that ultimately shape an attorney's decision about
whether to bring a federal civil rights action. I have not attempted to
reach conclusions about the relative weight practitioners give these
factors. In fact, my guess is that the answer would differ depending on
each unique case presented. The following issues-substantive law,
political changes, economic environment, and class differences-were
the factors most often mentioned by participants in the study.
A. Substantive Law
Time and again, plaintiffs' attorneys interviewed mentioned
changes in substantive law as a factor that has made practicing civil
253. Interviews 9, 14 & 19. This perception is born out by data regarding EEOC fll-
ings. In 1994, the EEOC received 91,189 charges, which represented a 53.4% increase over
1990, with much of the increase attributed to the ADA. By 1994, the ADA accounted for
20.7% of all of the charges filed with the EEOC. See Selmi, supra note 60, at 12-13.
254. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 originally was titled the Education of the Handicapped Act.
Congress amended it in 1991 and changed the name to Individuals With Disabilities Act,
20 U.S.C. § 1400 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
255. Interview 9.
256. Jorge Aquino, No Gold Rush for ADA Bar, THE RECORDER, Aug. 15, 1994, at 1.
Aquino noted that in California, for example, many lawyers do not wish to litigate under
the Americans With Disabilities Act. Part of their reluctance stems from the fact that
limited damages provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), give a disincentive to utilize federal law,
particularly because California provisions are more generous on damages and attorneys'
fees. Filing rates of ADA claims in other states are much higher than in California, how-
ever, presumably because few states provide state remedies that are better than the federal
remedies. Another factor contributing to attorneys' reluctance to file ADA claims may
stem from the unavailability of damages in public accommodations cases and some attor-
neys lack of familiarity with fee petitions.
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fights law more difficult.257 In the area of prisoner litigation, there
was agreement in the belief that substantive developments have
closed the door on much prisoner litigation.25 8 Several attorneys con-
ducting police misconduct litigation focused on qualified immunity as
a substantial obstacle, although those practicing in the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged the issue was easier to win there than elsewhere.25 9 In
the employment area, one example of a decision that makes litigation
more risky to undertake is the case of McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co., in which the Supreme Court held that after-acquired
evidence terminates backpay liability as of the date an employer
learns about employee wrongdoing meriting discharge.260 In the vot-
ing area, Shaw v. Reno,261 Miller v. Johnson,2 62 and the Court's recent
opinions in Bush v. Vera263 and Shaw v. Hunt,264 indicate a departure
257. Interviews 3, 5, 7, 12, 14, 15, 20 & 24. In addition to changes in the law itself
leading to increased complexity, arguably discrimination itself has changed since the enact-
ment of federal antidiscrimination legislation, and this change, in turn, increases the legal
burden to establish discrimination. For example, in the employment context, overt dis-
crimination has been replaced by more subtle discrimination, which can be camouflaged in
practices that appear to be facially neutral and non-discriminatory, but, in fact, perpetuate
past discrimination. WASBY, supra note 19, at 124-25.
258. Interviews 5, 16, 22 & 24. See Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Correc-
tions Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. Rv. 639, 699-716 (1993) (noting dramatic limitations in
prisoner due process and privacy rights as a result of Supreme Court decisions). See; e.g.,
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2294-95 (1995) (limiting prisoners' ability to state viola-
tion of a liberty interest protected by the due process clause to restraint which "imposes
atypical and significant hardship"). Legislative action, such as The Prison Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995, supra note 29, will also dramatically affect the ability of prisoners to raise
their substantive claims.
259. Interviews 3, 15 & 18. In 1982, the Supreme Court established an objective stan-
dard for qualified immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982). The Court
personalized the standard in subsequent cases by permitting courts to take into considera-
tion the circumstances facing the official and whether the "contours" of the right were
sufficiently clear to a reasonable official. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986);
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In 1992, the Supreme Court criticized the
Ninth Circuit for allowing a jury to decide if the police officer had acted reasonably and
declared that "ordinarily" a court should determine immunity before trial. Hunter v. Bry-
ant, 502 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1992). In Ninth Circuit cases decided after Hunter, juries were
allowed to decide qualified immunity issues. The Supreme Court denied certiorari with
scathing dissents. Navarro v. Barthel, 952 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 966, 967-68 (1992). See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Qualified Immunity from
Damages, SECION 1983 CiviL RIGrs LITIGATION AND ArroRNEYS' FEES 252-57 (1995).
260. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). This is because after-acquired evidence can change the
damages outlook of a case, making it less valuable than the attorney thought when she
accepted it. Interview 19. In fairness, however, one must acknowledge that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 has improved the prospects of employment litigation in significant
ways. See supra text accompanying notes 184 & 193-194.
261. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
262. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
263. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
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from previously established voting rights analysis.265 Apart from the
fact that substantive requirements have become more onerous in
some areas, the law changes so quickly that lawyers often have no idea




A number of plaintiffs' attorneys perceive the federal judiciary,
with the exception of the Ninth Circuit, and Congress, as having be-
come much more hostile to civil rights litigation.267 Although the
Civil Rights Act of 1991268 enhanced civil rights litigation in significant
respects, Congress recently decimated the Legal Services Corporation,
placing many restrictions on use of Legal Services funds.269 The funds
allocated to the Legal Services Corporation may not be used, for ex-
ample, to sue the government in any capacity, to bring class action
litigation, or to litigate on behalf of aliens or incarcerated persons.270
Recipients of Legal Services Corporation funds are now prohibited
from seeking and collecting attorneys' fees under statutory fee stat-
264. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
265. In United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977), a highly divided Supreme Court upheld New York's amended reapportionment
plan, which included majority-minority districts that effectively splintered the Hasidic com-
munity to which plaintiffs belonged. Despite the absence of a majority, five justices con-
cluded there was no viable argument that the plaintiffs, who were considered members of
the white majority, had suffered by having their influence diluted. SMOLLA, supra note 33,
at 2.03[2][a]. Beginning with Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court has examined whether
there are constitutional limits on the extent to which race-conscious decisions may be made
in drawing boundaries in voting districts. Id The Court in Shaw held that strict scrutiny
must be applied and that the state must demonstrate its reapportionment plan was nar-
rowly tailored to effectuate a compelling state interest. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653. In subse-
quent cases, the Court has continued to require that majority-minority districts be justified
under a strict scrutiny standard. Many commentators believe that the Supreme Court's
decisions will substantially limit the scope of the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Nancy K.
Bannon, The Voting Rights Act" Over the Hill At Age 50? 22 HUM. RTs. Q. 10, 12-30 (Fall
1995) (arguing that Shaw and Miller have taken "substantial teeth out of the Voting Rights
Act"); Selwyn Carter, African-American Voting Rights: An Historical Struggle, 44 EMORY
L.J. 859, 859 (1995) (arguing that recent decisions by the courts of appeal and the United
States Supreme Court have limited the scope of the Voting Rights Act).
266. Interview 20.
267. Interviews 8, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17 & 19-22.
268. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
269. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.




utes.271 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which will make
prison condition litigation much more difficult to pursue, is further
evidence of Congress' antipathy to some types of civil rights litiga-
tion.272 Civil rights lawyers in different practice areas seem to be
holding their breath, hoping Congress will choose not to amend legis-
lation affecting their cases. For example, one non-profit disability at-
torney expressed cautious optimism that because disability rights cut
across racial, economic, and social strata, Congress will leave the pro-
tections of the Americans with Disabilities Act intact.273 Needless to
say, attorneys already affected by funding cuts or sweeping substan-
tive change are pessimistic about their ability to continue to deliver
the same quantity and quality of legal representation.274
C. Economic Environment
The economic downturn of the past several years has affected the
practice of law in the area of civil rights as well as in other areas. One
attorney noted that it is difficult to collect from public agencies which
are in some instances virtually bankrupt. 275 Litigation costs are an-
other factor that make civil rights practice economically difficult for
plaintiffs' attorneys. Some attorneys mentioned the high cost of ex-
perts and that experts are unlikely to volunteer their services as they
might have in years past.276 In addition, the length of time involved in
taking a case to trial, defense strategies involving delay and paper bat-
tles, and the amount of resources that are channeled into collateral
litigation such as appeals of attorneys' fees awards make it hard to
keep a steady cash flow.277
Several attorneys noted how difficult it is for young lawyers to
begin practicing civil rights law today.278 They stressed that a civil
rights practice is not akin to a personal injury practice. One police
misconduct attorney whose firm handles both personal injury and civil
271. Id. Thus, recipients of money from the Legal Services Corporation are faced not
only with reductions in appropriations, but also with limitations on their ability to sur-
mount those reductions by more aggressively seeking attorneys' fees.
272. The Prison Litigation Reform Act, supra note 29.
273. Interview 9.
274. Interviews 22 & 27.
275. Interview 6.
276. Interviews 4, 7, 17, 20, 21 & 26.
277. WASBY, supra note 19, at 97-98 (recounting the difficulties civil rights organiza-
tions have experienced as a result of appeals of fee awards). Participants in this study
confirmed that they experienced long delays between receipt of a fee award and payment.
Interviews 11, 22 & 27.
278. Interviews 14 & 18.
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rights cases noted that one can expect the personal injury suits to set-
tle, but the civil rights cases will settle, if at all, only after extensive
litigation. In his view, practitioners entering the field have to be pre-
pared to work without a steady cash flow, a luxury few can afford-
especially in an era of high tuition debt and housing costs.
279
D. Class Differences
One attorney doing a mix of constitutional litigation, including
police misconduct cases, explained that the jurors one draws in some
jury pools are of such a different socio-economic class from his clients
that they cannot relate to the situations that have led to a deprivation
of rights. He told of a homeless, disabled man who decided to spend
the night at the apartment of relatives who operated a crack house.
During the night, the house was raided by police. The homeless man,
who says he did not interfere with or threaten the police, was beaten
on the head so severely that he lost his hearing in one ear. He con-
tacted the attorney, who was considering taking his case at the time of
our interview. The attorney concluded that the case could not be won,
even though he believed the homeless man had not threatened the
police and was the victim of excessive force. The attorney was con-
vinced that jurors would not understand why a person who was inno-
cent would take refuge in a crack house. The gap between them and
the potential client would be just too large.280
Although a number of attorneys referred to class differences
among various jury pools and although they clearly pick their forum in
large part based on jury pool,281 few described the issue as vividly as
the attorney consulted by the homeless man. Yet certainly in the con-
text of police misconduct and prisoner litigation, class differences are
a major factor affecting the viability of a case. The defense attorneys
interviewed also recognize the potential effect of class differences or
similarities on the outcome of a case. One city attorney in a predomi-
nantly African-American community indicated that police misconduct
cases litigated in front of jurors in the state court start with all assump-
tions in favor of the plaintiff. This factor induces the defense attor-
neys to remove cases, whenever possible, into federal court, with its




281. Interviews 2, 3, 10 & 14.
282. Interview 30.
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Although disparities in socio-economic status are not new, and
although they undoubtedly affect other types of litigation as well, they
do seem to play a large role in determining what types of claims civil
rights attorneys believe are palatable to jurors. These disparities help
to explain how a person with significant injury, and a claim found be-
lievable and meritorious by an attorney, could fail to obtain legal
representation.
VI. Testing Assumptions About Plaintiffs' Civil Rights
Lawyers and the Role of Civil Rights Actions
This Article has suggested that there are types of civil rights
claims which attorneys hesitate to pursue for economic or other rea-
sons. In sections to come, I will expand on my contention that this is
cause for serious concern. Prior to doing so, however, I will evaluate
study participants' background information and supplemental stories
that they shared about themselves in the context of various criticisms
of civil rights litigation and the lawyers who perpetuate it. Such an
evaluation is necessary as a prerequisite to any suggestion that the
status quo be changed.
The historical portrayal of the civil rights lawyer as servant of the
poor and downtrodden, if it was ever generally believed, is now chal-
lenged from all angles. Defense attorneys I spoke to stress the legiti-
macy of some civil rights actions, yet perceive that in the 1990's, fewer
claims warrant redress and huge numbers are unworthy of any re-
lief.283 From this viewpoint, plaintiffs' attorneys sometimes appear
self-aggrandizing and not sufficiently critical of the claims they pursue.
Another criticism of plaintiffs' civil rights lawyers comes from the aca-
demic world-from legal scholars who, as mentioned in the introduc-
tion to this Article, allege that civil rights lawyers may sometimes
"disempower" both their clients and their clients' communities
through their narrow focus on litigation and their tendency to view
social and economic problems though a legal lens.284
283. Interviews 30, 31 & 31.
284. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABouT So-
CIAL CHANGE? 336-43 (1991) (concluding that courts will be ineffective in producing any
social change because they are constrained by the following: lack of legal precedent, de-
pendence on political support, and lack of implementation power); William P. Quigley,
Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Orga-
nizations, 21 Omo N.U. L. REv. 455, 455-63 (1994) (stating that in the experience of three
community organizers, lawyers most often disempower the community by ignoring organi-
zation and using litigation as their only problem-solving approach); Paul R. Tremblay, Re-
bellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS LJ.
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The academic critique of civil rights litigation is well explained by
critical lawyering scholar Gerald P. L6pez whose work describes char-
acteristics of civil rights litigation that serve to reinforce the
subordinated status of people who seek its protection.285 In the
course of a hypothetical dialectic about the merits of constitutional
litigation under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, a fictional critic observes that
civil rights litigation perfectly reproduces and perpetuates existing so-
cial inequalities. He states:
The confrontation is highly regulated and the relevant issues
narrowly bounded. Both sides require the assistance of professional
representatives (lawyers) and submit to the decision of a third party
(judge), who claims impartiality and ignorance and purports to be
bound by norms over which s/he has no control. The outcome pre-
serves antecedent social relationships: the rarely losing defendant
surrenders only a predictable (and usually trivial) amount of money;
the rarely successful plaintiff is even more isolated from his or her
group by the grant of compensation
286
Other scholars share this disillusionment about the capacity of
lawyers to do much of anything positive through civil rights litiga-
tion,287 although this is by no means the prevailing view.288 Apart
947, 951 (1992) (writing that "[m]ost lawyers dominate lawyer-client interactions with their
expertise in technical matters, their use of mysterious legal language, their depersonaliza-
tion of disputes, and their greater perceived importance"); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on
the Margins of the Lawsuit Making Space For Clients to Speak, 19 N.Y.U. Rnv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 535, 545 (1987-88) (arguing that welfare litigators' tendency to use litigation to
effect broad social reforms compounds the alienation poor clients feel regarding the legal
system).
285. Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEo. L.L 1603, 1700-01 (1989).
286. I. at 1701. See also Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons From Driefon-
tein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699,742 ("This risk becomes greater if the
lawyer routinely presents litigation to the community as its optimal strategy. Litigation
may falsely raise in the community the expectation that appeal to 'the law' can somehow
give it power. Thus, the community may put its energy into litigation instead of into the
much more difficult work of organizing itself."); GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYER-
ING, ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACtiCE 51 (1992) ("When a client
asks a lawyer to intervene in his life, he seeks help at the risk of further subordination.").
287. WASBY, supra note 19, at 107-10 (noting this school of thought). See, eg., Mark
Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REv. 23, 23 (1993) (winning legal victories
almost never advances political goals); Mark Thshnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv.
1363, 1386 (1984) ("[rights-talk] ... is positively harmful"); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 523
(1980) ("The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only
when it converges with the interests of whites.").
288. Professor Richard Delgado has found that the vast majority of writing in the area
of civil rights takes what he characterizes as a traditional liberal view. The authors accept
the legitimacy of existing laws and, at most, argue for their reform. Richard Delgado,
Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing About Race, 91 COLUM. L.
January 1997]
from obstacles posed by the nature of the litigation process, some
scholars question whether predominantly white lawyers can under-
stand and adequately represent clients whose culture and social class
is so foreign to them.289 Other critical scholars have observed that the
legal system, and the lawyers who work within it, perpetuate class,
race, and sex hierarchies from generation to generation by making
such hierarchies appear legitimate and inevitable.
2 90
The criticism of civil rights litigation and of the plaintiffs' bar de-
scribed above is substantial enough to merit serious evaluation. Many
of the assumptions about civil rights lawyers appear unfounded based
on this Article's sample of survey participants, but some of the aca-
demic critiques of civil rights litigation-specifically those that reflect
on society and the legal system as a whole-ring true and should be
given credence.
The suggestion that civil rights litigation has been degraded by
attorneys who accept unmeritorious cases is one that cannot withstand
careful scrutiny. Some study participants did acknowledge that many
people seeking representation in federal civil rights matters lack meri-
torious cases.29' In the employment context, for example, employees
are often unable to distinguish between termination on legal grounds
and legally impermissible grounds. This inability to self-assess their
predicament is not, one would think, unique to potential civil rights
claimants. Some study participants also recognized that certain mem-
bers of the bar are willing to take bad cases in the hopes of settling
REv. 1547, 1547-48 (1991). For a thoughtful response to the criticisms raised by propo-
nents of Critical Race Theory and Critical Legal Studies, see Jules L. Coleman and Brian
Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 549 (1993).
289. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 574-77 (1984) (arguing that there comes a time when
white scholars, as well as white lawyers, need to step back from the forefront and allow the
intended beneficiaries of civil rights legislation to develop their own strategies and speak in
their own voices).
290. Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images. Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law, in CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES 366 (James Boyle ed., 1992)
("The principal role of the legal system.., is to create a political culture that can persuade
people to accept both the legitimacy and the apparent inevitability of the existing hierar-
chical arrangement."); GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RAcE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREhm
COURT AND MIoRITIEs IN CoNTEMPORARY AMERICA 117-18 (1993) (arguing that minor-
ity dependence on the Supreme Court to benefit minority interests ultimately benefits the
white majority by preserving a structure in which minority interests can be subordinated to
those of the majority with little opposition). See also ROSENBERG, supra note 284, at 139-
40 (describing Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s belief that blacks must not get involved in
legalism and needless court fights because to do so is to allow whites to draw out the fight
and because litigation would bring only incremental gains).
291. See interviews 3, 4, 13 & 25.
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them.292 However, the study participants emphasized, and the law it-
self reinforces, the need to be critical in case and client selection.
293
The plaintiffs' attorneys interviewed repeatedly noted that their eco-
nomic survival demands high selectivity and careful investigation
before undertaking representation of a client.294 Further, the defense
attorneys I interviewed were anything but pushovers. Mainly repre-
senting clients with substantial economic power, defense attorneys
stressed that refusal to settle unmeritorious or frivolous claims is im-
perative to effective representation of their clients.295
Likewise, the academic critiques about the motives and qualifica-
tions of civil rights lawyers should be viewed with skepticism. These
critiques do not describe the survey participants. Interestingly,
although the group interviewed was extremely diverse in terms of
race, age, and gender, the attorneys seemed to speak with one voice
on certain issues. First, many of the lawyers said they chose to prac-
tice federal civil rights law to help individuals and to bring about orga-
nizational or societal change. The following self-descriptions reveal a
vision of their work that goes well beyond the piecemeal, individualis-
tic focus emphasized by L6pez' fictional critic. Employment lawyers,
for example, volunteered the following motivations: commitment to
bringing about positive organizational change, a belief that employ-
ment litigation is necessary to make organizations deal with the
problems, 296 and commitment to help people without power who are
292. See interviews 4 & 25.
293. Interviews 2,4,6, 14,18 & 25; FED. R. Civ. P. 11, which provides sanctions in the
event an attorney is found to have filed documents that are not "well grounded in fact" and
"warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing laws," is a further disincentive. Rule 11 has been found to have disad-
vantaged civil rights plaintiffs more than any other category of litigant. The Rule has led
civil rights attorneys to advise clients to abandon potentially meritorious claims. Carl To-
bias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IowA L. REv. 1775,
1775 (1992) (arguing that Rule 11 has disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs more than any
other category of litigant); Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86
Nw. U. L. Rv. 943, 971 (1992) (showing that federal courts sanction civil rights attorneys
much more frequently than personal injury attorneys); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil
Rights Litigation, 37 BurF. L. REv. 485,489-98 (1988/89). Changes to Rule 11 which per-
mit an attorney to withdraw a motion or claim to avoid sanctions may alleviate reluctance
arising from the high rate of sanctions in civil rights cases. Selmi, supra note 60, at 45.
294. Interviews 2, 4, 6, 14, 18 & 25. See e.g., Eric L. Siegel, Building a Civil Rights
Practice, LEGAL Tims, Nov. 20, 1995 at 39-40 (describing how the author has built a suc-
cessful civil rights practice and noting that it is essential to accept the challenge "to select





hurt by those with power.297 Police misconduct attorneys described
their practices as: a labor of love,298 a vehicle for evolving standards of
decency,299 and a means of bringing about meaningful change in po-
lice practices and affecting major policy changes.300 A prison condi-
tions attorney said that despite small salaries, the attorneys in her
office stay because they are committed to the type of work they do.301
A voting rights lawyer stated his belief that it is incredibly important
to society to have responsive leadership, and that voting rights litiga-
tion can help in that regard, particularly on the local level.
3 02
A second characteristic the attorneys shared was an awareness of
the social and economic obstacles that many of their clients face. This
awareness made some participants skeptical about what they could
achieve through the practice of law, but most remained convinced that
civil rights litigation makes a difference in the lives of individuals and
in their communities. Some of the participants' stories reveal the level
of reflection about societal conditions better than I can describe them.
One of the cynics shared several experiences that made her ques-
tion her contribution as a civil rights litigator. This lawyer had han-
dled a large prison conditions case, which transformed the quality of
medical care in a state prison system. After the case was over, she
reflected on how the prison population had grown since that time, and
remembered a client she had tried to help obtain care for numerous
medical problems. This client, a middle-aged woman With no prior
criminal history, had received a 99 year sentence for possession of a
tiny amount of cocaine. Under state law, the client was not eligible
for parole for approximately twenty years; the attorney did not think
she would live that long. The attorney questioned whether medical
care makes much of a difference when you will likely spend the rest of








303. Interview 13. Most of the existing literature on the impact of litigation on correc-
tional institutions concludes that courts have had a significant and positive, albeit limited,
impact. See Sturm, supra note 258, at 652-59 (discussing three case studies of institutional
litigation). See also Mark J. Lopez & Dudley P. Spiller, Jr., The New Orleans Jail Litigation
(1969-1991), PRISON J., Fall-Winter 1990, at 50, 55 (concluding, as of the date of the article,
that years of litigation had led to some improvements in prison conditions but that the
defendants had never complied with many critical standards set forth in the federal district
court's decision). Professor Sturm also reviews three case studies that are extremely pessi-
mistic about the power of litigation to reach meaningful reform but disagrees with the
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This same attorney, now doing employment law, similarly
pondered how helpful employment litigation was to her clients. On
the positive side, she recalled a client whose job she saved by prompt
pre-litigation investigation and intervention with the employer. This
result was obtained for a fee of a few hundred dollars paid by the
client. The client thanked the attorney "for saving her life." The law-
yer, though gratified, noted the fee in no way covered the hours ex-
pended. In contrast, the attorney remembered a client who brought
suit for sexual harassment, received a settlement from which she re-
tained $125,000, but remained so psychologically distraught that she
was unable to put her life back together.3 4
A police misconduct lawyer, struggling in a solo practice, ob-
served that justice is elusive for his clients.30 5 After years of practicing
law, he has come to believe that justice lies in a combination of factors
beyond his and his clients' control. He advises them that even with a
meritorious case, litigation is a "crapshoot" at best. He continues to
represent people who live at the margins of society-who are so likely
to have encounters with the police that the best clients are "dead or in
jail, because at least then you know where they are." He believes
someone needs to do that work and to represent the kind of clients he
represents. In part he continues his practice because he thinks his op-
ponents would like to see him give up.
In contrast to the individuals whose stories are highlighted above,
most of the attorneys appeared to feel that they were making valuable
contributions to society through their practices. 306 One employment
lawyer in a non-profit office called his practice a "tremendous outlet"
for his energy, and said he feels happy thinking of clients who have
jobs, or better jobs, because of his work.3 07 A prison conditions attor-
ney stressed the commitment of the attorneys in the office.
308 In
authors' conclusions. See Sturm, supra note 258, at 652-59. For a fascinating description of
the changes in prison conditions between 1976 and 1986, see LARRY W. YACKLE, REFORM
AND REGRFT THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA PRISON
SYSTEM (1989). Professor Yackle concludes that prison conditions, particularly medical




306. See, e.g., interviews 2 (promoting positive organizational change through employ-
ment litigation), 7 (positive role of voting rights litigation), 13 (providing representation to
those who are poor and might otherwise not find lawyers), 15 (civil rights law furthers





short, many of the participants believed individuals, and in some in-
stances communities had benefited as a result of their intervention.
As a group, then, plaintiffs' attorneys professed both commitment
to the type of work they do and a belief in its social utility. This com-
mitment was balanced by a pragmatic acceptance of how careful one
must be in selecting cases and clients, particularly in private practice.
A surprising number of participants indicated a willingness to take
cases where they felt that the plaintiff had been wronged, regardless of
the fee involved and regardless of Supreme Court decisions that make
these cases less likely to turn a profit than in the past.
3 09
But the civil rights bar is by no means monolithic. Other study
participants appear to have built practices that serve mostly upper
middle-class clients who can afford to pay retainers and monthly fees.
These attorneys will take a case on principle once in a great while, but
on the whole, they do well without financial sacrifice.
310
A third generalization that can be made is that many of the attor-
neys interviewed are practicing creatively and cooperatively, as de-
scribed below. Some of the attorneys have begun working in groups
or teams to assist each other in assessing and staffing cases or to de-
cide which firm or individual should take control of particular is-
sues.311 Some of the attorneys mentioned that they bring in co-
counsel frequently, as a means to spread the risk of loss. One class
action attorney, for example, began her own firm with expertise about
class-action practice, but no bankroll behind her. She found private
firms willing to fund the litigation on a contingency basis if she would
direct it.312 Non-profit organizations doing prison conditions litigation
frequently associate with private law firms for the same purpose.31 3 A
non-profit attorney views coalition-building among various public in-
terest groups as an important part of his mission,314 and several other
attorneys echoed this thought.
309. Interviews 2, 5, 8, 13, 14 & 21.
310. Interviews 3 (very rarely would attorney take a special case not meeting retainer
and cost requirements) & 26 (legal rules have lead attorney to reject cases with high costs
and low potential yield).
311. Interview 2 (describing growth in co-counseling practice). Regular contact among
civil rights practitioners has long been common and is viewed as essential to planned litiga-
tion campaigns. WASBY, supra note 19, at 71. Professor Wasby traces the first civil rights
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With respect to non-litigation alternatives, a number of partici-
pants perceived the necessity and desirability of viewing clients in the
context of their communities and harnessing community resources to
address the client's problems. One attorney with a general constitu-
tional litigation practice said she has used community groups to help
build the factual basis for a case, thus saving costs that would be in-
curred in hiring private investigators or sending an associate to do the
work alone. This same attorney reported helping clients utilize civil-
ian review entities in police misconduct cases because often these
boards are the key to achieving real change in the police
department.315
Among the defense attorneys interviewed, a consciousness
broader than individual cases was apparent. A city attorney defend-
ing police misconduct claims pondered the dilemma of how to moti-
vate police officers to avoid behavior that becomes the bases of
lawsuits. He cautioned that it is difficult to say what brings about
change in an institution or that civil rights litigation makes a differ-
ence.316 A police misconduct attorney in private practice looks for
ways to settle cases that would result in some meaningful change, such
as education or training, as opposed to a simple exchange of cash.317
The descriptions offered above indicate that some of the charac-
terizations of civil rights litigators forwarded as part of a critique of
"rights" litigation are stereotypes. Whether the lawyers' perceptions
of what they do are accurate or a product of self-deception, and
whether these attorneys achieve any positive good in society ulti-
mately remains a matter of opinion. My own view is that academics
must separate their critique of civil rights lawyers from their critique
of civil rights legislation, courts, Congress and other parts of society.
A number of study participants appeared fully aware of the inability
of legislation, even if enforced, to remedy all societal injustices. They
concur with critics who assail judicial decisions as blind to reality.31 8




318. Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1989, in THE PoLrIcs OF
LAw, A PROGRESSVE CRiIQUE 121, 141 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed., 1990) (arguing that
the Court is willfully denying the realities of substantive inequality and white/black rela-
tions). This criticism is implicit in the respondents' analyses of some of the Courts' fee
decisions. For example, those that criticize the lack of enhancements believe the Court
does not understand the differences between litigating a civil rights claim and litigation of
other cases where fees are paid as they accrue. See supra text accompanying 163-164.
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sent the homeless man who was beaten up in the crack house, they
sometimes feel enormous disillusionment about how the legal system
handles problems and frustration about the decisions they must make
for economic survival. Nonetheless, on balance, they believe civil
rights legislation helps and that enforcement of that legislation is a
good use of their time.319
VII. Reflections on the Interview Data and Some Proposals
The plaintiffs' attorneys who participated in this study indicated a
desire to practice federal civil rights law despite legislative and judicial
obstacles and an ability to develop strategies to make civil rights prac-
tice more economically feasible. Nonetheless, certain trends that I
noted in the course of examining the various types of civil rights prac-
tice do not bode well for the future of some types of civil rights
litigation.
The chart reproduced below summarizes many of the influences
that lead attorneys to decide to reject cases offered by potential cli-
ents. As the discussion above has revealed, it would be overly simplis-
tic to suggest that the presence of any one factor or even multiple
factors would dissuade attorneys generally from undertaking repre-
sentation. Some attorneys, for example those practicing in non-profit
firms independent of Legal Services Corporation funding, may be un-
deterred regardless of the number of negative factors present. How-
ever, for private attorneys seeking to make a living practicing civil
rights law, the greater the number of these influences present, the
harder the decision to undertake the case.
319. Interviews 2, 7, 13, 15, 18, 24 & 25. These observations do not preclude the possi-
bility that attorney/client interactions could be improved by a variety of means. See Ruth
Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look
at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 687, 691 (1992) (listing
tenets of alternative lawyering, including humanization, politicization, collaboration, and
organization); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights
Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 769-72 (1995) (arguing that clients benefit from expanded
pleading that tells their stories and lets their voices be heard); L6pez, supra note 285, at
1705 (1992) (arguing that by combining litigation with other strategies, lawyers can chal-
lenge the traditional understanding and redefine § 1983 litigation); Lucie E. White, Subor-
dination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38
BuFF. L. REv. 1 (1990) (stressing the need to adopt legal strategies consistent with clients'
needs and experiences).
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As I reflect on the information gathered from the participants in
the study and the impact of factors that make civil rights practice
risky, two major trends stand out. These are the increasing financial
infeasibility of practice in certain types of cases and the financial disin-
centives for attorneys to represent plaintiffs of low socio-economic
status in some types of civil rights litigation. The Supreme Court's
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apparent failure to recognize the impact of certain of its decisions sug-
gests that in the future these disincentives will continue.320
Looking first at the issue of the financial infeasibility of litigating
certain types of cases, there is ample proof that while some areas of
civil rights practice are steady or growing, others have declined or are
declining precipitously. Both statistics and reports from plaintiff and
defense attorneys confirm the growth in the number of cases being
brought under some areas of federal civil rights law.321 Employment
law, disability law, and prisoner litigation (the vast majority of which
is unrepresented) are examples of growth areas identified earlier. It is
just as clear that federal civil rights litigation is shrinking in some ar-
eas as well. Civil rights class actions are a rarity.322 Voting rights
practice in the private sector is not economically viable.32 Prison con-
ditions litigation, at least if litigated outside the disability context, 32 4 is
extremely costly. The private firms that previously participated in
prison conditions litigation are less likely to be involved.325 Police
misconduct cases, according to the attorneys who handle them, are
hard to refer and difficult to handle profitably unless the clients have
incurred injuries reminiscent of Rodney King's. Cases that test the
boundaries of constitutional law or federal statutory law can pose a
risk of devastating financial losses to attorneys should they ultimately
not prevail.
When one changes focus slightly to examine potential plaintiffs'
access to legal representation, it is abundantly apparent that despite
the existence of the Attorney's Fees Awards Act and other fee-shift-
ing statutes, persons of low socio-economic status appear less able to
attain representation in a federal civil rights case. The study revealed
a variety of factors that make representation of persons of low socio-
economic status financially difficult and risky for attorneys. As dis-
cussed above, low damages, whether in the context of employment or
police misconduct claims, have a decided influence on whether an at-
320. Congress could, of course, modify the effects of the Supreme Court's decisions, as
it did in passing The Civil Rights Act of 1991. See supra notes 193-194.
321. See supra note 21-30.
322. See supra note 235.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 189-191.
324. Expert fees are available under the Americans With Disabilities Act, thus making
disability litigation in the prison context more viable than non-disability based claims. In-
terview 24. See also supra text accompanying note 184.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 182-184 & 249-250. Private funding for correc-
tions litigation, which has been provided by The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, has
also been terminated. Sturm, supra note 258, at 723 n.396.
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torney will be willing to take a case.326 Attorneys participating in the
study confirmed what the damages rules suggest: that the better the
salary of the plaintiff, or the higher the plaintiffs' damages, the more
desirable the case and the better the plaintiff's chance of obtaining a
lawyer.3 27 Exceptions exist, of course, but there is good reason to be-
lieve that the promise of the Attorney's Fees Awards Act-enforce-
ment of federal civil fights even though the rights may be non-
pecuniary in nature-is sometimes illusory.
Despite the limitations of this study in terms of sample size and
the other variables that undoubtedly influence the climate of civil
rights litigation, I am convinced that the Supreme Court decisions ex-
amined in this Article have contributed to the disincentives noted
above. It seems clear that, over the past two decades, the Court,
through its opinions in cases such as Evans v. Jeff D., Marek v. Ches-
ney, and City of Burlington v. Dague, has tried to send civil rights law-
yers the following messages about litigation tactics and strategy:
parties should settle cases when possible and assume certain risks
when they refuse reasonable settlement offers; attorneys should be
compensated in an amount commensurate to the hours expended; and
if a case appears too tenuous to merit assuming a risk of loss, it should
be declined. These messages could seemingly apply to any type of
litigation and do not, on their face, appear controversial.
The problem with the Court's approach is that some civil rights
cases possess unique characteristics that distinguish them from other
types of litigation, such as personal injury practice. While at times the
Supreme Court seems to glimpse this distinction and advert to it,328
more often the Court's decisions appear to treat civil rights claims as a
species of tort claim. Because the injuries in certain types of civil
rights cases are so different from traditional personal injury, the
326. See supra text accompanying notes 207-214.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 207-226. Professor John J. Donohue has
shown that the cases resulting in the largest awards in any class of employment discrimina-
tion suits under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) are those by white,
male professionals and managers. According to his calculations, the average monetary
judgment per plaintiff was $135,574 in a "pure" ADEA case, i.e., a case in which age was
the only basis for discrimination. In non-ADEA cases the average award was $15,206.
John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three Concepts of
Equality, 92 MicH. L. Rnv. 2583, 2587 n.18 (1994).
328. The Court has stated in numerous cases that it generally rejects a contingent-fee
model of fee awards in civil rights cases. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87 (1990);
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561,
574 (1986) (plurality opinion). Nonetheless, the effect of the Court's attorneys' fees deci-
sions and damages rules has been to give attorneys the incentive to evaluate civil rights
cases as though their recovery will be dictated by a contingency fee.
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messages that the Court has sent litigators have produced unintended
effects.329 The result is that in some cases the normal carrots and
sticks that motivate litigation decisions do not apply.
The question of settlements and settlement strategy after Jeff D.,
for example, illustrates the difficulties in assuming a parallel between
civil rights litigation and tort litigation. On the one hand, it is true
that plaintiffs' attorneys have been able to protect themselves from
requests for waivers and obtain satisfactory payment from clients on a
contingent fee basis in some types of cases. On the other hand, the
non-pecuniary character of some damages, combined with factors
such as unpopularity of plaintiffs, complexity of the litigation, and in-
stitutional disincentives for certain defendants to settle, makes some
civil rights litigation much more difficult than tort litigation and less
profitable as well. When a number of these factors coalesce, settle-
ments do not produce the same monetary return one would expect in
personal injury litigation, and thus, attorneys become reluctant to take
certain types of cases. While the Supreme Court's assumption is that
attorneys should refuse cases that are unmeritorious, the attorneys in
the study indicated that economic and other concerns caused them to
reject cases they thought were meritorious in some situations.
The Supreme Court's virtually absolute rejection of risk enhance-
ment is another example of a ruling that has produced unexpectedly
harsh effects in some types of cases. The notion that the ultimate fee
award reflects the number of hours an attorney has expended, and
thus includes built-in compensation for the difficulty and complexity
of the litigation, works in some cases: those that are neither expert-
intensive nor unpopular in which the plaintiff's level of success on the
merits convinces the court that the hours expended were well spent.
In those types of cases, even some plaintiffs' attorneys agree that en-
hancements would produce windfalls. 330 On the other hand, in cases
where attorneys are faced with delays in payment and the uncertainty
329. The unintended effect is that some categories of civil rights claims are not treated
comparably to other types of civil wrongs. But see RicHARD A. EPrIN, FORBIDDEN
GROuNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 29-30 (1992) (assert-
ing that while it is tempting to argue that discrimination victims have at least as good a
claim for relief as victims of force, the parallels are not persuasive. In Epstein's view,
"[t]he victim of discrimination, unlike the victim of force, keeps his initial set of entitle-
ments-life, limb, and possession-even if he does not realize the gains from trade with a
particular person."). Id at 30. Epstein would thus place an employment discrimination
claim on a much lower scale of importance than an intentional tort claim. Id. The Attor-
neys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 and other statutory fee provisions indicate that Congress
has not accepted Epstein's views. See supra text accompanying notes 38-38.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 170-173.
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inherent in litigating risky (but not unmeritorious) claims, the lodestar
rate may undercompensate the attorney. Payment of an hourly rate
following five to seven years of difficult litigation, and then only if one
prevails, is not the equivalent of an hourly rate paid monthly regard-
less of the litigation outcome. Where these adverse factors domi-
nate-in police misconduct cases challenging entity policy or in voting
rights cases, for example-the result is that those areas of practice
become less and less desirable. Voting rights cases in particular seem
affected by every variable that can possibly make them financially un-
tenable for attorneys.
The results of this study suggest that in the 1990's the practice of
federal civil rights law is at a crossroads. Although Congress and the
Supreme Court have often nurtured the practice of civil rights law,
today the effect of certain Supreme Court decisions and the failure of
Congress to respond to those decisions has negatively impacted the
ability of attorneys to represent civil rights plaintiffs in some types of
cases.
A more comprehensive study, using a larger sample of practition-
ers, should be conducted to further explore the conclusions of this
study. Based on the results obtained here, however, attorneys, judges,
and legislators ought to take a hard look at the areas in which civil
rights litigation is becoming untenable. One need only review post-
Civil War history to find a road to equality paved with good intentions
that were quickly abandoned.331 In addition, the Twentieth Century is
filled with examples of states that undermined efforts by African-
Americans and other minority groups to participate fully in the polit-
ical, economic, and social structures controlled by the majority.33 2
The subordination of women by state legislation reinforcing lines be-
tween the sexes and by the Supreme Court through deference to state
legislation is equally well-documented.3 33 Society's memory of this
history is short, and there is little public perception of the need for
vigilance about enforcement of civil rights legislation, particularly
331. Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REv. 1323, 1336-43 (1952).
332. Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in
the Progressive Era. Part I The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 CoLum. L. REv. 444, 475 (1982)
(discussing inequalities in southern public schools during the progressive era); DERRICK
BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, 185-200 (3d ed. 1992).
333. See generally John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by
Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675 (1971) (reviewing and analyz-
ing cases in which courts have dealt with sex discrimination by law). See also HERMA HIL
KAY, SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION: TExT, CAsES & MATERIALS, 1-11 (3d. ed. 1988).
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when it benefits unpopular plaintiffs such as prisoners or people who
have interactions with police that give rise to misconduct claims.
Those schooled in law and history need to reinforce the collective
memory; to recognize that perhaps human nature has not changed,
and that regression rather than progression is a possibility.
The question of what ought to be done to address the obstacles to
enforcement of civil rights legislation is difficult to answer. One possi-
bility, of course, would be to abandon any pretense that enforcement
of civil rights legislation can or will improve the societal problems that
exist as a result of the subordination of minorities. One would then
address the underlying issues by other means, such as political mobili-
zation or community organization. The other option is to work to
bring about governmental reform, such as legislative change or new
insight in the judiciary, while continuing to confront societal problems
by other means as well.
I favor the second option because, as a number of critical scholars
recognize, people likely to bring civil rights actions often do not have
the luxury to opt out of civil rights litigation entirely in favor of a
better strategy for bringing about social change.334 Thus, even though
reforms in the system may only come slowly, if at all, I believe that
civil rights lawyers and other interested citizens must continue to press
for reform, while at the same time pursuing other creative ways to
address societal problems that find their roots in discrimination.
335
In assessing the ways in which legislation or judicial decisions
might address some of the problems in enforcement of civil rights leg-
islation, it is useful to recognize how important private practitioners
are to the enforcement scheme. Cut-backs on federal funding of legal
334. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW
PROFESSOR, 148-65 (1991) (the argument that rights are not useful, or even harmful, trivial-
izes black experience as well as the experience of any person or group "whose vulnerability
has truly been protected by rights"); Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 402-05 (1987).
335. See, e.g., Roy L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 14-19
(1992) (combining proposals for self-help including mentoring of impoverished African-
American families by middle and upper class African-American families, and major re-
forms of civil rights legislation); Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination
Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2370, 2409
(1994) (acknowledging the pessimism and despair that critical theorists have experienced
as they explore the success of antidiscrimination legislation, and proposing structuralist and
cultural domination theories as a foundation for challenging inequality in employment);
Monica J. Evans, Stealing Away: Black Women, Outlaw Culture and the Rhetoric of Rights,
28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 263 (1993) (suggesting redefinition of rights in context of
relationships modeled on experiences of African-American women in churches and clubs).
See also infra text accompanying notes 360-360.
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services, restrictions on practice areas of legal services entities, and
the financial difficulties of non-profit law centers have increased more
than ever the role private practitioners play in enforcement of civil
rights legislation.336 While in recent years private firms have partici-
pated in tandem with publicly funded law centers to bring suits, these
coalitions are fragile. Given litigation costs, delays in payment, and
the myriad difficulties associated with attorneys' fees awards, it is un-
realistic to believe private firms will pick up the cases that publicly
funded lawyers do not or cannot bring. Thus, given the responsibili-
ties that will fall on the private bar, attorneys' fees awards are of
greater importance than ever.
Another factor that influences the types of proposals that might
address the problems described above is the diversity and complexity
of federal civil rights practice. Rules that have no adverse effects in
one practice area can be devastating in another. Thus, when consider-
ing how rules and policies affecting that practice ought to be changed,
it may be best to consider needed changes in the context of particular
practice areas. This narrow focus departs from the Supreme Court's
long-standing practice of addressing attorneys' fees issues in broad
terms, without reference to how they may play out in various types of
civil rights litigation. A narrower focus is necessary, however, because
litigation under the assorted civil rights statutes has become so spe-
cialized, and practice experiences so divergent from one another, that
generalizations have become inaccurate. Congress and the federal
courts must take extra steps to address the reasons that civil rights
practice has become infeasible or substantially more difficult in cer-
tain areas.
A. Expert Fees
Having argued the case for bolstering incentives to private attor-
neys to become more active in certain types of civil rights practices, I
suggest that broadening the availability of awards of expert witness
fees in civil rights cases would be an excellent place to start. Expert
336. Professors Eisenberg and Schwab confirm that most civil rights litigation is
brought by small private firms and solo practitioners. Eisenberg & Schwab, Explaining
Constitutional Tort Litigation, supra note 21, at 768 n.178 (citing J. Casper, Lawyers in
Defense of Liberty: Lawyers Before the Supreme Court in Civil Liberties and Civil Rights
Cases, 1957-1966 at 207 (unpublished Ph.D thesis 1968)). Professor Selmi demonstrates
the importance of private representation in his article as well. The empirical data he
presents show that individuals who are able to obtain counsel will have a far greater likeli-
hood of obtaining relief and that relief is likely to be approximately twice as high as that
which might be obtained by the EEOC. Selmi, supra note 60, at 57.
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witness fees are already permitted under Title VII and under the
Americans with Disabilities Act.337 Permitting a prevailing plaintiff to
recover reasonable experts' fees is an effective way to relieve plaintiffs
of the cost burden of litigation without awarding amounts that give a
windfall to the plaintiff's attorney.
Voting rights litigation is an example of a practice area in which
attorneys cannot afford to undertake representation absent expert
fees. Given the high litigation costs, attributable in large part to the
need for experts, attorneys' fees awarded at a lodestar rate do not
adequately compensate. Damages awards, which in other types of liti-
gation might offset the high costs of experts, will not do so in a voting
rights case. The simplest way to assure fair compensation in a voting
rights case, and to remove disincentives to representing plaintiffs,
would be to allow an award of reasonable expert fees to a prevailing
plaintiff.
A similar case can be made for allowing expert fees in prison con-
ditions litigation, which is likewise expert-intensive with a focus on
equitable relief. Attorneys practicing police misconduct law also
claim that expert fees are an issue in section 1983 policy or custom
cases, although in these suits damages might in some instances cover
the costs of experts. For simplicity's sake, Congress might choose to
place the discretion to award expert fees in the hands of the district
courts, accompanied by legislative history recounting the types of
cases in which awards ought to be contemplated. Alternatively, Con-
gress might single out particular statutes under which expert fees
should be permitted.
Despite the simplicity and common sense of this proposal, I rec-
ognize it may be politically unpopular, particularly if the burden of
paying expert fees falls on financially strapped public entities. Even in
the area of voting rights, which has enjoyed bipartisan political sup-
port,33s Supreme Court decisions seem to signal a deep ambivalence
337. See supra note 183. The House Report on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 recognizes
that employment law is expert intensive, and that it is virtually impossible to try an em-
ployment discrimination case unless expert fees are covered. The committee found that,
"[e]ven [worse], denial of recovery for expenses of experts seriously threatens to deny
aggrieved workers access to the courts at all. The vast majority of aggrieved workers are,
virtually by definition, unable to afford to pay the significant costs of employing experts
out of their own pockets." H.R. Rep. No. 40(I), 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1991), re-
printed in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 615. The same point is valid in other expert-intensive
civil rights actions.
338. ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHosE VOTES COUNT? AFMRMATIVE ACrION AND
MINoRrrY VOTING RIGHTS 79-136 (1987) (recounting the politics of passage of the Act and
subsequent amendments).
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about the ultimate goals of voting rights litigation.3 39 This ambiva-
lence may well exist in lawmakers' minds as well. With respect to
prison conditions litigation, public and political support seems even
more unrealistic. Anything that would enhance the ability to chal-
lenge prison conditions is unpopular in today's political climate.3 40
Given the lack of commitment and outright hostility in the minds
of judges, legislators, and the public towards certain types of civil
rights litigation, the best civil rights organizations and attorneys can
hope for is an understanding that meritorious cases do exist,341 and
that attorneys willing to take the risk of bringing such cases should be
fairly compensated if they prevail. Risk of loss, particularly when ex-
pert fees are huge, will more than adequately deter plaintiffs' attor-
neys from making imprudent judgments about which cases ought to
be brought.
B. Increase attractiveness to attorneys of meritorious low-damage cases
My second suggestion is that the rules regarding calculation of
damages in civil rights cases ought to be revised to permit more gener-
ous awards in cases where damages, as presently calculated, are too
low to attract representation. As noted earlier, low damages in civil
rights cases may stem from the tendency of jurors to undervalue con-
stitutional claims and, in cases where lost earnings are part of the
damages, from the low socio-economic status of the plaintiff.34 2 Many
attorneys interviewed for this study concurred in their assessment that
plaintiffs with low damages are not as likely to get representation,
even for meritorious claims, as plaintiffs with high damages.3 43
Class-based disparities resulting in lower damages for low wage
earners are also evident outside the civil rights arena, for example, in
339. See supra notes 261-266.
340. See The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, supra note 29. In addition to the
limits on attorneys' fees, the Act restricts challenges to prison conditions by amending 18
U.S.C. § 3626 to limit judicial discretion to award prospective relief, preliminary injunctive
relief and prisoner releases. The Act also amends the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Per-
sons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(c), to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in prison
condition litigation cases.
341. Certainly the facts regarding disgraceful prison conditions have been brought to
the Supreme Court's attention in the past. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,
419-31 (1980) (Blackmun, J., and Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Sturm suggests that in
the future, corrections litigation will gain a new focus including greater emphasis on en-
forcement, informal advocacy, and alternative dispute resolution. Nonetheless, she con-
cludes that attorneys will have a major role to play in maintaining constitutionally
acceptable conditions in correctional institutions. Sturm, supra note 258, at 737-38.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 200-202 & 212-214.
343. See supra notes 208-209.
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tort litigation. As troubling as this may seem in the tort context, at
least there are mitigating circumstances in ordinary tort litigation.
First, the typical tort involves personal injury-a context familiar to
jurors. Second, even when a personal injury plaintiff has low lost
earning capacity, jurors can supplement the award through pain and
suffering awards that correspond in a rough sense to the magnitude of
injury suffered.344 Third, in some types of cases-notably intentional
torts and defamation-damages may be presumed under certain cir-
cumstances. Despite the inclination some may have to view civil
rights actions as torts, the cases present themselves so differently that
the mitigating factors in a tort action do not provide the same safety
net in a civil rights case. Given the nature and frequency of settle-
ments in civil rights cases, the promise of fee awards simply is not
enough to convince attorneys to represent plaintiffs whose damages
are low.
It is not easy to say how the law ought to be changed because not
all cases involving low wage earners or poor people are unattractive to
lawyers.345 One proposal, forwarded by Professor Jean Love, favors
permitting juries to award presumed damages in federal civil rights
cases where the injury suffered is intangible.346 Professor Love reads
prior Supreme Court decisions to preclude awards based on the "in-
herent" value of constitutional rights, but not to preclude presumed
general damages for "intangible" injuries caused by constitutional vio-
lations.3 47 Common law precedents relied on by Justice Powell have
actually permitted presumed damages on several occasions.3 8 This
344. Tort-like damages are often only coincidental in constitutional rights cases. Com-
ment, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus,
93 HARv. L. REv. 966, 976 (1980).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 210 & 215-220.
346. Jean C. Love, Presumed General Compensatory Damages in Constitutional Tort
Litigation: A Corrective Justice Perspective, 49 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv. 67, 79-91 (1992).
347. Id. Professor Love relies on Justice Powell's opinions in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 264 (1978), and Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306-07
(1986). In Carey, Justice Powell spoke about the possibility of awarding presumed dam-
ages in the case of a deprivation of the right to vote, characterizing the loss as one that
cannot easily be quantified. Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 n.22. Justice Powell again mentioned
voting rights cases as an example of a deprivation of rights that might merit presumed
damages. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310-11.
348. In Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953-54, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 135 (K.B. 1703),
the House of Lords reinstated the trial court's damage award of 200 pounds in a case
involving the denial of the plaintiff's right to vote. These precedents have been followed
by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927) (recognizing
the right to proceed where plaintiff sought $5,000 damages for deprivation of the right to
vote). These precedents have also been followed in some lower court decisions. See, eg.,
Wayne v. Venable, 260 F.64 (8th Cir. 1919). More recently, the district court in Vargas v.
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suggestion deserves serious consideration. If presumed damages were
available in cases where the injury suffered by the plaintiff is funda-
mentally intangible, plaintiffs would bring a great deal more leverage
to the settlement stage of any litigation. Civil rights attorneys might
begin to evaluate low damages claims in a more favorable light.
The disadvantage to this approach is that, while it may be palat-
able for violations of the 15th Amendment guarantee of the right to
vote, it would be difficult to convince Congress or the Court that dam-
ages are being awarded because the harm suffered is intangible rather
than to compensate for the inherent value of the right deprived.
349
One might well believe that once the door to presumed damages is
open, the settlement value of all federal civil rights cases will in-
crease-even those in which damages are already high enough to at-
tract competent counsel with the promise of a contingency fee or
ultimately a fee award. Thus, the specter of presumed damages is
either so narrow that it would assist only voting rights plaintiffs with
constitutional claims or so broad that as a practical matter it would be
legally and politically unrealistic. Nonetheless, courts would do well
to recognize that presumed damages are not utterly foreclosed by the
Supreme Court's decisions.
Another proposal to raise the damages recoverable in civil rights
actions was forwarded by Judge Jon 0. Newman almost twenty years
ago.350 At that time, Judge Newman questioned the propriety of as-
sessing damages for violations of federal civil rights statutes "against
the background of common law tort liability,'' 351 and proposed that
liquidated damages should be available in addition to compensatory
damages. 352 That proposal has never been adopted in the context of
constitutional litigation, but certainly merits consideration in areas in
which compensatory damages are inadequate to attract counsel.
353
Calabrese, 634 F. Supp. 910,913 (D.NJ. 1986), affd, 949 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1991), ruled that
plaintiffs were entitled to recover presumed damages. Professor Love reports that a settle-
ment was ultimately reached in which plaintiffs received both a nominal payment and addi-
tional monies determined by the degree of obstacles to voting they faced. Love, supra note
346, at 84.
349. Justice Powell expressly refused to award presumed damages for a violation of
procedural due process in Carey, 435 U.S. at 263-64. Professor Love argues that he did so
because he viewed other remedies-injunctive relief and compensatory damages-as ade-
quate to make the plaintiff whole. Love, supra note 346, at 90.
350. Newman, supra note 197.
351. Id at 461 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)).
352. Id. at 465.
353. Limited liquidated damages are available in actions under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act. The plaintiff may recover liquidated damages of twice the compensa-
tory damages when she proves a willful violation. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1985); Hazen
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Yet another way to encourage attorneys to undertake representa-
tion of persons whose damages are not high enough to provide a fi-
nancial incentive would be to restore the power of courts to award fee
enhancements in civil rights cases. The Supreme Court's decision in
City of Burlington v. Dague virtually foreclosed enhancement based
on the contingent risk posed by a case. While the Court believed that
the riskiness of a case would be fairly compensated by a lodestar
award, state courts such as those in California have recognized that
other factors may well influence an attorney's willingness to represent
civil rights plaintiffs.354 Under California law, for example, courts
have enhanced the lodestar figure based on the novelty and complex-
ity of the litigation,355 preclusion of other employment,35 6 or, if a case
is undesirable, for reasons unrelated to its merits.3 57 If courts are
given guidance as to what factors may serve as the basis for enhance-
ment, if they recognize that an enhancement need not be given in
every case in which it is sought, and if they recognize that enhance-
ments might consist simply of an incremental adjustment of the plain-
tiffs' fee to a reasonable level rather than an automatic doubling or
trebling, fee enhancements should not be the threat that the Supreme
Court perceives them to be.
C. Non-traditional suggestions
Many writers have contributed to the discussion and debate
about non-legal and non-traditional means of addressing societal
problems that result from discrimination. 358 While a comprehensive
survey and analysis of various proposals is beyond the scope of this
Article, this project made me more keenly aware of the need for fresh
ideas about how American society should deal with the problems that
stem from discrimination. The proposals of those who challenge the
legitimacy and efficacy of current federal civil rights legislation suggest
a variety of possible directions. Lani Guinier's work in the voting
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 614-17 (1993) (holding that a violation of the ADEA is
willful if employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its
conduct was prohibited by statute).
354. See generally PEARL, supra note 33, at § 13.5-16.
355. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1I1), 20 Cal. 3d 25, 49 (1977).
356. PEARL, supra note 33, at § 13.8. The California Rules of Professional Conduct
enumerate the factors that may be assessed in determining whether a fee is reasonable.
Cal. Rules of Prof. Cond. 4-200(B).
357. Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69, 70-71, 78-79 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (plaintiffs were
injured while committing armed robbery, and their family members sued the police for
excessive force).
358. See supra notes 284-290 & 335.
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rights area imagines a different and more participatory world if voting
rights were viewed with different underlying assumptions and perspec-
tives.359 Roy Brooks has suggested ways in which civil rights law
might be made more effective in addressing the needs of African-
Amercans.36 0
Many scholars move beyond creative legal reform to societal re-
form. Gerald L6pez stresses community organization.3 61 Roy Brooks
proposes that African-Americans mentor other African-Americans
through working and poverty classes and describes his vision of how
such a program would work.3 62 Derrick Bell, pessimistic that racism
will ever end, has gone so far as to propose a Racial Preference Li-
censing Act, under which businesses could discriminate if they
purchased a license, the proceeds of which would be placed in a fund
for African-Americans.
363
While I do not share Professor Bell's profound disappointment
with the ability of federal civil rights legislation to make a difference,
certainly some of the ideas suggested by critics deserve careful exami-
nation. Many suggestions are entirely consistent with a renewed com-
mitment to enforcement of federal civil rights protection.
VIH. Conclusion
In this project, I have sought to bridge the often enormous gap
between theory and practice and, by doing so, to understand the state
of civil rights practice in the 1990's. In the course of this study, I have
been privileged to meet many lawyers who work on a daily basis with
civil rights legislation, and who have far more insight about how and
when litigation works than most academics will ever have. The pic-
ture that appears from a synthesis of their contributions is both inspir-
ing and troubling. Anyone who cares about the problems sought to be
addressed by federal civil rights legislation would be impressed by the
359. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REv. 1413, 1416-17 (1991).
360. BROOKS, supra note 335, at 150-73.
361. LOPEz, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW
PRACTICE 275-339 (1992) (describing "Etta," a citizen activist; describing orthodox or-
ganizing and individuals who go beyond orthodox organizing by, among other things, facili-
tating participation that leaves people able to take credit for the fight and control of their
lives).
362. BRooKS, supra note 335, at 131-49.
363. DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BorroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 47-52 (1992).
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dedication, compassion, and understanding of many lawyers who
practice in this area.
Yet even the most ardent believer in the power of federal civil
fights legislation to correct societal injustice must emerge from this
project with a deep sense of concern. While it is true that civil fights
attorneys are pragmatic and resourceful in responding to precedents
that make their jobs more difficult and less profitable, the net result of
a number of Supreme Court decisions is that certain types of civil
fights practice, and certain types of plaintiffs, have fallen to the bot-
tom of the heap. In these instances, the promise of federal fights leg-
islation, and society's long-standing recognition that "fights" are
valuable even if non-pecuniary, have been forgotten.
It is clearly unrealistic to view civil fights legislation as any kind
of panacea for society's problems. The attorneys who practice civil
rights law would be among the first to acknowledge this. Yet civil
fights legislation remains a tool, and a valuable one at that. I hope that
the insights of this study, along with the data developed by others, will
enable those who are in a position to advocate for legal reforms to
make progress in bringing about changes that will help to ensure the
effectiveness of civil rights legislation.
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